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Environmental Challenges
Lori A nn T h ru p p ’s article, “Costa
Rica’s Resource Challenges,” (Hemi
sphere [W inter/Spring 1990]), is
b oth provocative and frustratingly
incom plete. O ne can hardly argue
against h er analysis o f the severe
and continuing degradation o f the
natural resources o f Costa Rica.
Likewise there is little question
about the contradictory econom ic
and environm ental policies o f the
governm ent.
H er vision, however, seems par
tial and shortsighted in many o ther
respects. H er allusions to the m ajor
ity o f Costa Ricans’ lack o f interest
in wildlife, tourism , an d science are
totally lacking in evidence. Indeed
th ere is substantial evidence that
carefully m anaged environm ental
projects n o t only integrate local
com m unities into the projects, bu t
also help to raise their environm en
tal consciousness. Daniel Janzen
deserves praise rath er than criti
cism for saving one o f the last re
m aining tropical dry forests in
C entral America. Prior to the estab
lishm ent o f Guanacaste National
Park, the area was u n d er im m inent
th reat o f destruction from exportorien ted cattle ranching. Blaming
Janzen for p erpetuating inequi
table developm ent, as T hrupp
does, is ludicrous.
T h ru p p also appears to ignore
the m ajor initiatives o f the Costa
Rican governm ent through its Na
tional Strategy for Sustainable De
velopm ent. This policy, adopted
after widespread public debate, is
based exactly on w hat T h ru p p ar
gues: “th at the social dim ensions of
conservation cannot be ignored
and th at the political-economic
roots o f the problem m ust be direcdy co n fro n ted.” This policy,
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along with the new Regional Con
servation Units, (see my article,
“Saving Costa Rica’s Environm ent,”
Hemisphere [Fall 1989]), attem pts to
do precisely that. O f course, it faces
enorm ous potential resistance and
obstacles and its effectiveness re
mains to be proven.
I would suggest, however, that
we contribute very little to solving
Costa Rica’s problem s by dam ning
the country’s dependence on ex
p o rt agriculture w ithout offering
solutions for handling the difficult
transition between an exporto riented econom y and a lessd ep endent, domestically oriented
economy. Social justice is indeed a
radical aim, b u t with intelligent
planning it may also be a realistic
goal.
Jack W. Hopkins
School o f Public
an d Environm ental Affairs
Indiana University

A Promising Path?
In “An Inform al Path to Develop
m ent?” (Hemisphere [W inter/Spring
1991]), A lejandro Portes criticizes
The Other Path, by Peruvian econo
mist H ernando de Soto. U nfortu
nately Portes fails to support his
contention that De Soto’s “message
is little m ore than the long-familiar
‘m agic-of-the-marketplace’ doc
trin e.” W hat Portes gives us is a
lam e ideological diatribe, devoid
o f any analytical o r policy alterna
tive to De Soto’s work—a work
based on exhaustive field research
and a sound m ethodological fram e
work.

T he prim ary reason for the
international celebration o f De
Soto’s book (which is subtitled
The Invisible Revolution in the Third
World) is that it provides a thor
ough analysis and policy map, n o t
only for solving problem s regard
ing the subterranean (informal)
sector b u t also for moving T hird
W orld econom ies toward a new de
velopm ent path. De Soto’s book
represents the freshest and most
significant contribution to T hird
W orld developm ent policy in the
last two decades. As such, the book
did m uch to rescue international
developm ent policy from a rapid
slide into obscurity and irrele
vance. Contrary to Portes’s asser
tion, De Soto certainly did n o t
“appropriate and reassert what was
already know n.”
T he failure o f the form al sector
as an engine o f growth and devel
o pm ent in the T hird W orld has
given im petus to the inform al
economy. To be sure, the inform al
sector has failed to lower unem ploy
m en t rates, raise wages and salaries
to keep pace with inflation, in
crease the availability o f basic
goods and services, an d improve
the econom ic infrastructure.
Nevertheless, it represents the
T hird W orld’s citizenry’s spontane
ous, creative, and rational response
to the incapacity o f national states
to satisfy their basic needs. Poverty
and misery have prom o ted selfreliant, survival networks in the
form o f the inform al sector. These
networks are a sensible response to
decades o f econom ic oppression
brought on by state-interventionist
policies.
Portes’s notions concerning the
benefits o f subsidized credit are
misleading. A lthough access to
credit is an im portan t aspect o f the

continued success o f the inform al
sector, econom ic evidence shows
th at subsidized credit has had disas
trous consequences for T hird
W orld developm ent. T he m ajor
beneficiaries o f subsidized credit
have b een public enterprises and
the non-poor. In fact, subsidized
credit has becom e a transfer pro
gram for the non-poor while credit
regulations and artificially low inter
est rates have len t themselves to fur
th er patronage and corruption. In
T hird W orld subsidized credit p ro
grams, loans in arrears range from
30% to 95%; in contrast, nonsub
sidized loan program s have loan re
covery rates exceeding 95%. W hat
would be beneficial for the infor
mal sector’s access to credit would
be loan program s characterized by
m arket rates, low transaction costs,
g reater borrow er access to lenders,
an d some linkage between repay
m ent an d future lending.
T he inform al sector has encour
aged risk-taking and enterprise in
the T hird W orld regardless o f so
cial class, enabling large num bers
o f p o o r people to achieve subsis
tence o r better.
Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr.
International C onsultant
an d Econom ic Adviser
Weston, O ntario, C anada

Researchers who conducted field
work on urb an poverty an d the in
form al econom y in Latin America
and elsewhere in the T hird W orld
during the 1960s and ’70s should
be interested to learn that their
collective effort and findings fell
short. Now, as Kempe Ronald

H ope tells us, “the exhaustive field
research and a sound m ethodologi
cal fram ework” used by H ernando
De Soto and his followers have fi
nally revealed the truth. Informalsector activities th at we had seen as
an ingenious bu t frequently desper
ate m eans o f survival, turn out to
be no less than the seed o f future
national developm ent. While re
searchers painstakingly traced the
m echanism s through which large
capitalist firms em ploy and exploit
inform al labor, they failed to note
the fundam ental characteristic of
the latter— that it is an engine o f
growth. But thanks to superior sta
tistical abilities an d ethnographic
skills assembled by De Soto at his
Institute for Liberty and Democ
racy, the truth shines; street ven
dors and shantytown sweatshop
workers are really the en trep re
neurs o f tom orrow, destined to
move their countries out o f u n d er
developm ent once the nefarious
m ercantilist state is taken ou t of
the way.
H o p e’s portrayal o f events does
n o t stand up to the evidence. De
Soto is a skillful politician an d a
brilliant ideological synthesizer,
b u t he is no scholar. T he effort to
portray the spread o f the inform al
sector in Latin Am erica as the
m arch o f progress has proven at
tractive to some powerful circles,

which may explain why The Other
Path is distributed by US consulates
and embassies th ro u g h o u t the re
gion. Nevertheless, this glowing
portrait has little relation to the ac
tual condition and prospects o f in
form al entrepreneurs and their
workers.
“De Soto’s prescription and
m ine,” President George Bush
declared, “is to . . . unleash a mil
lion sparks o f energy an d en ter
prise; let the incentive o f reward
inspire m en and wom en to work
b etter for themselves and their
families.” Econom ist David Felix
calls this “a particularly grotesque
piece o f P.R. gymnastics.” I will con
ten t myself with calling it a n o th er
simplistic recipe to resolve the
problem o f underdevelopm ent
that is destined, like its predeces
sors, to bite the dust.
For a review o f research evi
dence on the ingenuity and crea
tivity o f the urban poor published
ten to fifteen years before De
Soto’s grand appearance, H ope
may consult Alejandro Portes and
Jo h n W alton, Urban Latin America
(University o f Texas Press, 1976).
For a review o f recent research on
the dynamics o f inform al en ter
prise both in advanced and lessdeveloped countries, he may
consult Alejandro Portes, M anuel
Castells, and L auren B enton (eds.),

H em isphere welcomes letters to the editor. Letters must be typed double-spaced, and
are subject to editingfor clarity and length.
Please address letters to: The Deputy Editor, H em isphere, Latin American and Carib
bean Center, Florida International University, University Park, Miami, FL 33199;
FAX (305) 348-3593.
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Letters to the Editor

The Informal Economy (Johns
H opkins University Press, 1989).
T he conclusion o f the latter book
provides the “alternative fram e
w ork” for policies toward the infor
mal sector th at H ope dem ands and
th at space prevented m e from in
cluding in the original com
mentary.

;Yasalio la Gula del
Periodismo Centroamericano!
Esta publicacion
de 188 paginas
contiene:

Alejandro Portes
D epartm ent o f Sociology
T he Jo h n s H opkins University

• Nombres de mas de
3.000 periodistas
• Datos sobre
27 periodicos

Advocating Violence?
Father Ed Cleary was so concerned
to twist the knife in his review of
my book Is Latin America Turning
Protestant? (“Politicized Religion,”
Hemisphere [Sum m er 1990]) th at I
should m ake two points. First, he
may be right th at too m uch space
is devoted to the spectrum o f US
evangelists in Latin America. But I
felt obliged to exam ine the issue be
cause o f indiscrim inate broadsides
against the “invasion o f the sects”
by Catholic bishops who have yet to
be corrected by their in-house ex
perts. If so many Catholic scholars
h ad n o t ignored evangelicals, I
w ould n o t have h ad to write the
book, let alone establish the dif
ference between the evangelical
mission establishm ent an d the
religious right.
Second, contrary to Cleary, Is
Latin America Turning Protestant?
does n o t echo the conservation
canard th at liberation theology is
responsible for advocating vio
lence. I do em phasize that, by
asserting rights in repressive situa
tions, consciousness-raising has
often provoked m ore reprisals than
Christians can defend themselves
against. Most readers should be
able to tell the difference between
these two points.
David Stoll
D epartm ent o f Anthropology
Stanford University
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SITTING IN THE EARTH AND LAUGHING
A HANDBOOK OF HUMOR

A. Roy Eckardt
This book is at once a serious guide to humor and an entertain
ing embodiment of humor itself. Designed to cross disciplinary
boundaries, it directs itself to the sense and nonsense of humor
in contemporary individual and social life.

ISBN: 1-56000-001-5 (cloth) 192pp. $29.95

ANTHROPOLOGICAL OTHER OR
BURMESE BROTHER?
STUDIES IN CULTURAL ANALYSIS

Melford Spiro
Classical anthropology has come under attack in recent years for
its guiding belief in a common humanity between cultures as an
expression of Western hegemonic discourse. This volume refutes
these views and defends classical anthropology.

CELEBRATIONS
THE CULT OF ANNIVERSARIES IN EUROPE AND
THE UNITED STATES TODAY

William M. Johnston
Every year hundreds of historical anniversaries attract media at
tention and government investment in ever greater degrees. This
insightful volume explores the causes and consequences of this
major phenomenon of our time.

ISBN: 0^88738-375-0 (cloth) 196pp. $29.95

ENCOUNTER WITH ANTHROPOLOGY
SECOND EDITION

Robin Fox
This volume is at once an introduction to anthropology, an ac
count of a personal odyssey, and a call to rethink the discipline.
After showing the range, potential, and weaknesses of anthropolgy as a science, Fox outlines a new anthropology that will restore
its original task of exploring human nature.

ISBN: 0-88738-870-1 (paper) 346pp. $19.95

THE INVENTED INDIAN
CULTURAL FICTIONS AND GOVERNMENT POLICIES

James A. Clifton, editor
This volume aims to reconstruct our understanding of the
American Indian, past and present. It examines in careful, ac
curate ways social myths about Indians and explores how these
cultural fictions promote divisiveness and translate into policy.

ISBN: 0-88738-341-6 (cloth) 300pp. $39.95
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Caribbean Development Options
by Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens

he structural adjustm ent
policies o f the Interna
tional M onetary Fund
(IMF) and the W orld
Bank have been widely
criticized for im peding
ra th e r than prom oting develop
m en t in the C aribbean during the
last decade. For instance, such poli
cies have drastically curtailed gov
ern m en t expenditure on education
an d health. As a result, a portion o f
the reg io n ’s m eager resources
m ust be channeled into the m ere
rehabilitation o f deteriorated physi
cal infrastructure and hum an re
sources, leaving little o r nothing
for program s th at broaden the
p o p u latio n ’s access to education
and health care. Likewise, struc
tural adjustm ent policies n o t only
neglect small-scale local agricul
ture— a significant source o f em 
ploym ent and food—they also
expose it to form idable interna
tional an d dom estic com petition
from export-oriented agribusiness.
Consequently, small-scale agricul
ture has declined to the p oint that
m ajor investments are required ju st
to achieve a m odicum o f recovery,
a situation th at com pounds the
C aribbean’s problem s o f unem ploy
m en t and purchasing power.
N onetheless, there is some de
gree o f optimism for the 1990s.
T he en d o f the Cold W ar may p er
m it the C aribbean to articulate an

T

Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens
are professors o f political science and
sociology, and Faculty Fellows of the
Centerfor Urban Affairs and Policy
Research, at Northwestern University.
They are co-authors (with Dietrich
Rueschemeyer) o/Capitalist Devel
o p m en t and Democracy (Polity and
University of Chicago Press, 1992).

6

Hemisphere • Fall 1991

alternative developm ent m odel
that com bines growth, equity, and
democracy. Such an opportunity
could extend to the reshaping of
econom ic and political relations
am ong Caribbean nations as well.
Crafting an alternative develop
m ent m odel m ust begin by recog
nizing two basic changes in the
world economy. First, th at the grow
ing international mobility o f capi
tal and the related globalization of
production greatly dim inish op
portunities for effective econom ic
intervention by national states. Sec
ond, th at the form ation o f regional
trade blocs is posing new chal
lenges for the C aribbean, particu
larly for those countries that are
m em bers o f the Lom e Convention.
O n the positive side, these two
changes indicate a potential for
the expansion o f intra-Caribbean
trade. O n the negative side, they
expose the smaller countries to
com petition from the larger coun
tries for access to N orth Am erican
markets, and the Lom e m em bers
to the loss o f privileged access to
E uropean markets. This array of
opportunities and obstacles m eans
that skillful negotiation to prom ote
cooperation am ong C aribbean
countries an d to shape their rela
tions with the wider world will be
essential to any successful develop
m en t m odel for the 1990s.
T he case o f Jam aica illustrates
these opportunities and obstacles.
How m ight Jam aica’s policymakers
m aneuver in this setting? W hat are
the im plications for the Caribbean?

Past Models
Since 1970Jam aica has b een eco
nomically transform ed. Its baux
ite / alum ina sector declined as a
foreign-exchange earn er relative to

tourism and export m anufacturing.
Local agriculture for the dom estic
m arket was first h u rt by im port
deregulation and then devastated
by a hurricane. This same h u rri
cane dam aged traditional export
agriculture already suffering from
declining term s o f trade. Finally,
local m anufacturing for the dom es
tic m arket declined as a result o f
im port deregulation.
These shifts h ad serious con
sequences for the comparative
abilities o f the public and private
sectors to influence the country’s
econom ic developm ent. T he rela
tive decline o f b au x ite/alu m in a as
a foreign-exchange earn er dim in
ished the state’s econom ic weight
in collecting revenues and allocat
ing resources; the diversity and
decentralization o f the ascendant
exchange earners, tourism and
nontraditional exports, m ade them
m ore appropriate for private-sector
activity and, therefore, less am ena
ble to state intervention. In addi
tion, the interest-rate policies
prescribed by the IMF have con
centrated econom ic assets in the
hands o f a few large groups based
in financial services. These eco
nomically powerful groups, now
influential in dom estic politics,
have shown no inclination to invest
outside the financial, com m ercial,
and tourism sectors.
In this context, is it feasible for
Jam aica to retu rn to the industrialization-by-invitation m odel it fol
lowed in the 1950s and ’60s? Even
overlooking the incom e inequality
associated with this m odel, there
are several reasons why it would fail
in the 1990s. To begin with, indus
trialization by invitation was driven
by foreign investm ent in b au x ite/
alum ina and tourism. Investm ent
in these sectors, however, no

longer approxim ates the m agni
tude n eed ed to generate sustained
econom ic growth. Even assuming
the availability o f sufficient foreign
capital, past experience shows that
foreign investm ent in the m inerals
an d tourism sectors did n o t estab
lish adequate linkages with the
rem ain d er o f the economy. More
over, generalized protection o f do
mestic industry—which was a vital
aspect o f industrialization by invita
tion— im peded econom ic develop
m en t in the long run throughout
the C aribbean an d Latin America,
mainly by shielding inefficient
local producers from com petition.
Is it feasible, then, for Jam aica
to retu rn to President Michael
M anley’s dem ocratic socialist path
o f the 1970s? T h at path, which,
practically speaking, stressed eco
nom ic redistribution to the detri
m en t o f investm ent, requires state
access to a large new inflow o f re
sources from ex p o rt earnings. Such
access is also req u ired for a m ore
investm ent-oriented state-led devel
o p m en t m odel. Yet n o such access
is on the horizon for the foresee
able future. Sources for foreign
borrow ing will b e scarce as well,
particularly for a democratic-socialist governm ent, which could not
afford the u n p o p u lar policies asso
ciated with IMF conditionality. The
Jam aican state, therefore, would be
unable to assume direct com m and
o f the econom y outside its already
established participation in the
b au x ite/alu m in a industry. Rather,
its role would be one o f econom ic
regulation. This role, however,
dem ands an efficient state appara
tus, the lack o f which was a key rea
son for the failure o f Jam aica’s
dem ocratic socialism in the 1970s.
As a result o f the drastic deteriora
tion o f public-sector salaries in the

1980s, the m anagerial weakness of
the state is even worse today.
A nother departure from the
m odel o f the 1970s, as well as from
that o f the 1950s an d ’60s, would
have to be the use o f m ore selec
tive im port controls. In the long
term , protection would have to be
aim ed at developing low im portcontent, domestically oriented in
dustries with a chance o f becom ing

Indiscriminate state
shrinking would
jeopardize previous
economic development
in key sectors.

competitive internationally. For
exam ple, given the small size o f its
hom e m arket, Jam aica m ight want
to protect the m anufacturing o f fur
n iture b u t n o t refrigerators. Still an
o th er d eparture from the m odel of
the 1970s would have to be success
ful attem pts to obtain higher and
m ore stable prices for raw m aterial
exports through agreem ents with
o ther T hird W orld producers.
Jam aica would also have to find
niches for its nontraditional
exports and to negotiate special
trade relations with regional m ar
ket blocs.
T hough Jam aican president
Edward Seaga in the 1980s pro
claim ed his adherence to a neo
liberal m odel, he in fact pursued
policies that were m uch closer to a
state-capitalist m odel, with the im
p o rtan t exception o f trade deregu

lation. W ould such a state-capitalist
m odel be the m ost viable one in
the 1990s, particularly since the
econom ic conditions o f this de
cade will be similar to those o f the
preceding decade? T he state-capi
talist m odel could generate eco
nom ic growth if it recognized the
necessity o f a sm aller state-owned
econom ic sector, m ore efficient
state apparatus, and m ore (though
selective) protection. A m ajor prob
lem, however, would likely appear
in the area o f political strategy.
Due to its negative consequences
for the distribution o f wealth and
incom e, the m odel o f the 1980s
would require substantial govern
m ent expenditures on patronage—
by definition, unproductive—in
o rd e r to m aintain a base o f popu
lar support. Com plicating this p ro b
lem is the certainty that, in the
post-Cold W ar setting, no Carib
bean regim e could co u n t on a spe
cial relationship with the US like
th at o f Jam aica’s in the 1980s. Re
gimes pursuing a state-interventionist path, even a state-capitalist
one, would be particularly disadvan
taged in their relations with the US.

The Neoliberal Model
Given that IMF policies currently
hold sway, an obvious question is
w hether a p u re neoliberal m odel
would work in the 1990s. A basic
problem with this m odel stems
from the fact that the Jam aican
state was quite effective in areas
such as the baux ite/alu m in a indus
try, banking, an d im porting es
sential goods. Consequently,
indiscrim inate state shrinking
would jeopardize econom ic devel
opm ent. An unregulated private
sector was apparently successful in
tourism and export-platform m anu
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facturing, b u t appearances are de
ceptive. T he state has conducted
tourism m arketing in both the US
and E urope through the Jam aica
T ourist Board; and in the early
1980s Jam aican president Seaga
and US president Ronald Reagan
did the im p o rtant com plem entary
work o f m an agingjam aica’s inter
national political image. M ean
while the political negotiation of
special access to the US garm ent
m arket was crucial to the growth of
Jam aica’s export platform s, as like
wise were the devaluations that
greatly cheapened the cost of
Jam aican labor.
In any case, if the essence o f
econom ic developm ent is the im
provem ent o f living standards by in
creasing lab o r’s productivity, then
a m odel based on thie degradation
o f living standards by cheapening
labor can n o t be effective. At the
least, im plem enting such a m odel
in Jam aica would leave the coun
try’s ex port platform s vulnerable to
com petition from lower-wage coun
tries in the C aribbean and else
where.
T he strongest argum ent against
a p u re neoliberal m odel is the lack
o f any historical precedent. No
small, export-oriented econom y
has ever becom e a successful late
developer by following this path.
This fact is clear with respect to the
econom ic developm ent o f both
small E uropean countries and the
“Asian Tigers” (H ong Kong, South
Korea, Singapore, an d Taiwan). In
bo th instances econom ic develop
m en t revolved aro u n d the rela
tively equitable distribution of
wealth in the prim ary sector and
state protection o f infant indus
tries, as well as a wider range o f
state regulatory and en tre p ren e u r
ial activities. To argue th at Carib
bean recovery and developm ent
can be accom plished through a
neoliberal m odel with indiscrim i
nate tariff reduction, deregulation,
and state shrinking is to completely
m isread the com parative evidence.
Even if correctly read, however,
the experiences o f the Asian Tigers
could n o t be replicated by Carib
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bean countries for two reasons.
First, the post-World W ar II strate
gic im portance o f South Korea and
Taiwan provided them with mas
sive US aid, which their states chan
neled into dynamic econom ic
sectors. Second, as a study by Wil
liam R. Cline shows, if all T hird
W orld countries reached the ex
p o rt density o f the Asian Tigers,
their m anufactured exports would
rapidly confront protectionist re
sponses in the developed world. As
a result, 80% o f such exports would
face problem s o f m arket access.

Toward an Alternative Model
W hat conclusions can be drawn
for C aribbean developm ent in the
1990s? Arguably a developm ent
m odel for the C aribbean should
concentrate on state intervention
in the following spheres: prom ot
ing special export markets; guiding
investm ent into areas with high ex
p o rt potential; establishing link
ages between agricultural and
industrial developm ent in both
the use o f local resources and the
creation o f a dom estic m arket; and
im proving hum an resources.
W ithin this framework, the state
should carry o ut land reform to cre
ate efficient family farm ers, agri
cultural service, and m arketing
cooperatives. M oreover the state
should selectively p rotect dom estic
industry and should prom ote free
trade with countries o f roughly
equal developm ent. T he latter
implies strong efforts to establish
regional integration. T he state
should encourage foreign invest
m ent where it will contribute to foreign-exchange earnings o r savings
an d where dom estic resources are
insufficient. T he issue o f distribu
tion should be addressed through
state support for small enterprises,
b oth individual and collective, and
through im proved public health
and education program s, which are
essential to the developm ent o f a
skilled labor force.
T he preceding is n o t a naive
wish list. It does n o t include in
creased governm ent spending on

social welfare o r public-sector jo b
creation, simply because the re
sources for such undertakings are
unavailable in the 1990s. It concep
tualizes redistribution n o t in term s
o f governm ent spending on con
sum ption, bu t in term s o f produc
tive assets an d access to health care
and education.
In this setting, a political strate
gy based on populist appeals would
be counterproductive; eith er the
prom ises could n o t be fulfilled or
the developm ent policies would be
derailed. W hat is req u ired is pains
taking political organization, along
with political education regarding
developm ent opportunities an d ob
stacles. This approach is necessary
to forestall n o t only th e political as
cendance o f opportunistic p o p u 
lists whose irresponsible policies
could thwart developm ent efforts,
b u t also the political alienation of
the rank-and-file population d u r
ing economically difficult times.
Political organization an d educa
tion should be directed at forging a
coalition between the m iddle and
lower classes in supp o rt o f this de
velopm ent m odel, as well as at fos
tering an accom m odation with the
capitalist class. To be sure, p ro
grams such as land reform could
jeopardize such an accom m oda
tion, depending on the socioeco
nom ic structure o f the particular
country. It is thus crucial th at land
reform and related program s n o t
be orchestrated as general attacks
on private property, and th at invest
m ent opportunities be created in
oth er sectors o f the economy.
This developm ent m odel and
political strategy could be catego
rized as social dem ocratic o r a m od
erate form o f dem ocratic socialism.
It may seem a pale shadow o f the
developm ent vision pursued in
Jam aica in the 1970s o r o f dem o
cratic-socialist ideals in the 1990s.
Nevertheless, in light o f its corre
spondence to the successful m od
els o f small late developers an d its
consequences for C aribbean living
standards, the approach is m ore
prom ising than th at o f the neo
liberals. ■
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Women in Public O ffice
by Kathleen Logan

n February 14,1991,
In addition to these high-profile
successes, Latin A m erican and
Dulce M aria Sauri
C aribbean wom en have won o ther
Riancho de Sierra took
office as the first woman
im portant national offices in grad
governor o f Yucatan,
ually increasing num bers. Between
Mexico. In so doing
1975 and 1987 the growing num 
she jo in ed C. P. Ana Rosa Payanb er o f wom en in the region’s parlia
m ents raised the female portion of
Cervera, the first woman mayor of
M erida, an d Ligia Cortez Ortega,
national legislatures from 5% to
the first wom an chief justice o f the
8%. In Dom inica wom en hold
m ore than 20% o f the ministerial
state suprem e court, to form a tri
um virate o f wom en in the key state
level positions—a percentage
offices o f Yucatan. T he presence of
equaled o r surpassed by only two
o th er nations worldwide, B hutan
wom en at the center o f political
and Norway.
power is n o t unique to Yucatan,
b u t indicates a Latin Am erican and
C aribbean tren d o f increased fe
m ale participation in public life.
Since the mid-1970s wom en
have begun to be elected to the
The growing number
highest offices o f Latin Am erican
and C aribbean nations. Lidia
of women in public
Geiler o f Bolivia (1979) andV iooffice does not easily
leta C ham orro of Nicaragua (1990)
were elected presidents; Eugenia
translate into broader
Charles o f Dom inica (1980) and
M aria Liberia Peters o f the N ether
gains for Latin
lands Antilles (1988) were elected
American and
prim e ministers. (N either Isabel
P eron o f A rgentina [1974] nor
Caribbean women.
Ertha Pascal Trouillot o f Haiti
[1990] was elected to the presidency
o f h e r country.) And with the an
n o u n cem en t o f h er presidential
candidacy, M argarita P enon de
Arias o f Costa Rica becom es the
Latin Am erican an d Caribbean
m ost recen t Latin Am erican
wom en also have a growing pres
wom an to seek h er country’s top
ence in local public offices and in
governm ental position.
public-sector service jobs. W om en
such as Luiza E rundina and Pascuala Rosado have been elected
mayors in such markedly different
Kathleen Logan is associate professor of
cities as Sao Paulo, Brazil, and
anthropology at Florida International
Huaycan, Peru. In the region as a
University and H em isp h ere’s book re
whole, an average o f 20% o f state
view editor. Her current research project
adm inistrators and m anagers are
is En las Calles: W om en’s Collec
women, the highest levels being
tive O rganizing in M erida, Yucatan,
those o f A rgentina (28%) and
Mexico.
Mexico (24%).
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The entrance o f wom en into
public life via the ballot box and
public-sector em ploym ent com ple
m ents the well-known grassroots po
litical activism o f Latin Am erican
and C aribbean women. Since the
1960s m any women, especially
those from low-income groups,
have participated in the reg io n ’s
com m unity, religious, ecological,
peace, hum an rights, and trade
union movements. -

Grassroots Spin-Offs?
T he growing nu m b er o f wom en in
public office, however, does n o t eas
ily translate into broad er gains for
women. For a variety o f reasons, ad
vances for wom en are likely to be
increm ental, built u po n w om en’s
traditional caretaker roles or
linked to efforts to improve condi
tions for citizens in general.
Since public officials o f eith er
gender are elected by female as
well as m ale voters, they are likely
to focus on issues th at m ark the
lives o f women an d m en alike, such
as poverty and sectarian violence.
T he issues that prim arily affect
women, such as abortion, rape,
pornography, family violence, gen
d er discrim ination, an d exploita
tion o f dom estic workers, will likely
continue to m erit less attention
from both female and male of
ficials.
T he problem s that fem ale and
m ale politicians m ust confront-—
especially regarding the crises o f
their national econom ies—are so
com pelling th at the issues that
principally affect wom en occupy
secondary status. With lim ited re
sources to com bat grave national
problem s, politicians m ust set prior
ities th at often leave w om en’s is
sues unresolved.
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T he entrance o f women into
public life via the ballot box and
public-sector em ploym ent com ple
m ents the well-known grassroots po
litical activism o f Latin Am erican
an d C aribbean women. Since the
1960s m any women, especially
those from low-income groups,
have participated in the reg io n ’s
com m unity, religious, ecological,
peace, hum an rights, and trade
union movements.

Grassroots Spin-Offs?
T he growing num ber o f wom en in
public office, however, does n o t eas
ily translate into bro ad er gains for
women. For a variety o f reasons, ad
vances for wom en are likely to be
increm ental, built u po n w om en’s
traditional caretaker roles or
linked to efforts to improve condi
tions for citizens in general.
Since public officials o f either
gender are elected by female as
well as male voters, they are likely
to focus on issues th at m ark the
lives o f wom en and m en alike, such
as poverty an d sectarian violence.
T he issues that prim arily affect
wom en, such as abortion, rape,
pornography, family violence, gen
d er discrim ination, and exploita
tion o f dom estic workers, will likely
continue to m erit less attention
from both female and male of
ficials.
T he problem s that female and
m ale politicians m ust confront—
especially regarding the crises o f
their national econom ies—are so
com pelling th at the issues that
principally affect wom en occupy
secondary status. With lim ited re
sources to com bat grave national
problem s, politicians m ust set prior
ities that often leave w om en’s is
sues unresolved.

Changes for the better in the
lives o f Latin Am erican and Carib
bean wom en will com e w hen m ore
general conditions in the region
improve. Econom ic reactivation,
the en d o f political violence, and
advances in education, health, and
public services will increm entally
help women.
T he success o f efforts to im
prove the conditions o f life for
wom en p er se requires that female
political leaders ally themselves
with female grassroots activists. Suc
cess in form ing alliances with such
wom en will d ep en d upon the
leaders’ ability to capitalize on the
issues th at m ost concern wom en at
the grassroots. Many o f the con
cerns o f these wom en grow o u t of
th eir traditional roles as family and
com m unity caretakers. Thus, issues
such as em ploym ent, education,
health care, an d public services are
obvious rallying points for such an
alliance. Since wom en at the grass
roots have taken a special interest
in ecology and hum an rights, at

tention to these issues will also en 
able female politicians to broaden
their support am ong women. If alli
ances are form ed between wom en
politicians an d wom en grassroots
activists, they could begin to con
fro n t those problem s that alm ost
exclusively affect women.
In no case, however, will prob
lems such as family violence, rape,
pornography, abortion, gender
discrim ination, and the exploita
tion o f dom estic workers be easily
resolved. For exam ple, the ques
tion o f abortion rights will provoke
the opposition o f the Rom an Cath
olic C hurch, and that o f pornogra
phy will provoke debate about
censorship. T he m atter o f rights
for dom estic workers will divide
wom en by econom ic interests,
while that o f gen d er discrim ina
tion will strike at the core o f socie
tal role definitions for wom en and
m en.
In form ing alliances with grass
roots activists, wom en politicians
are likely to be least successful if

they organize u n d er the b a n n e r of
feminism. In Latin Am erica and
the C aribbean, the term “femi
nism ” is m ore controversial than
in N orth Am erica and W estern Eu
rope. A lthough feminism is losing
its connotation as a N orth Ameri
can im port o f dubious value—and
its long history as a home-grown
m ovem ent is gaining recognition—
to be labeled a “fem inist” is still a
political handicap.
In addition to the prom ise of
alliances between wom en politi
cians an d wom en grassroots activ
ists, the election o f wom en to
public office prom ises o th er
long-term gains for women. The
prom inence o f female politicians
creates new, socially accepted roles
for wom en an d provides role m od
els for future generations o f fe
males. In the long ru n the growing
presence o f wom en in public life
will help to redefine the Latin
A m erican and C aribbean gender
description o f power and influ
ence. ■
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Chile: The Perfect Transition?
by Pamela Constable

fter 18 m onths o f civil
ian rule, C hile’s sm ooth
retu rn to dem ocracy
from dictatorship is
being widely hailed as
the “perfect transition.”
Bloodless an d legally neat, the tran
sition period has been m arked by
an obsession with avoiding confron
tation and reestablishing a sense of
norm alcy after two decades of
traum a an d conflict.
Halfjokingly, pundits are start
ing to com plain that Chile has be
com e boring. A capital w here cafes
once flowed with wine and debate
until dawn has been reborn, 17
years later, as a businesslike h u b of
consum er culture and pragm atic
politics. Every divisive issue is
sm oothed over o r w atered down
in endless negotiations. “Is there
no room left for dream s, illusions
and utopias?” worries Jose Joaquin
B runer, a leading sociologist, in a
recen t essay.
T he governm ent, a center-left
coalition head ed by Christian Dem
ocrat Patricio Aylwin, has adopted
a m odest agenda an d com prom is
ing style, aim ed largely at appeas
ing its right-wing opposition in the
legislature and the arm ed forces.
Econom ic officials, once bitter
critics o f the free-m arket m odel
im posed by the form er military re
gime, have swallowed their pride
and adopted the m odel nearly
wholesale, keeping C hile’s growth
and inflation rates am ong the
healthiest in the continent.

A

Pamela Constable is the Latin America
correspondentfor the Boston Globe.
She is co-author (with Arturo Valen
zuela) of A Nation o f Enemies:
Chile u n d e r Pinochet (W. W. Nor
ton, 1991).
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Even G eneral Augusto Pinochet,
the dictator who once earned
worldwide pariah-hood as he pre
sided over a ruthless police state, is
being gradually rehabilitated. “We
have to give him credit for his eco
nom ic success, and for behaving
well in a new institutional situation.
As he becom es less worrisome, peo
ple are jud g in g him m ore mag
nanim ously,” com m ented Eugenio
Tironi, a governm ent spokesm an
and sociologist who once wrote
books that detailed social injustice
u n d er Pinochet.
Abroad, the whitewashing o f
C hile’s recent history has been
m ore blatant. In international fi
nance circles, P inochet’s record of
foreign-debt repaym ent and privati
zation were far b etter known—and
m ore relevant—than his record of
torture and prisoner disappear
ances. Now that o th er Latin Ameri
can dem ocracies are scram bling to
copy C hile’s form ula for econom ic
revitalization, the darker side o f its
dictatorship is being conveniently
forgotten.
In a colum n in the Washington
Post (August 23,1991), Michael
Schrage even suggests that the
fum bling coup-plotters in Moscow
could have “gotten some pragm atic
advice from a despot who really
knew how to run a co u p ”—G eneral
Pinochet. “T he ruthlessly efficient
pragm atism o f the Pinochet m odel
may ultimately prove m ore appeal
ing than the still-elusive prom ises
o f glasnost an d perestroikahe adds.

Cynical Counsel
Conservative Chileans m ight agree,
b u t to others such cynical counsel
would be a slap in the face. They
include the hundreds o f thousands
who lost their livelihood and

dignity during the labor purges
that accom panied P inochet’s eco
nom ic “shock treatm en t”; the
tens o f thousands who were im
prisoned, tortured, o r forced into
exile after the 1973 military coup;
and the families o f at least 700 pris
oners who vanished in military
custody.
T he governm ent’s response to
the volatile issue o f hum an rights
has been rhetorically bold but
legally timid. In M arch 1991 a blueribbon official commission pro
duced a harrowing rep o rt that
describes a systematic terro r cam
paign by P inochet’s secret police
and details m ore than 2,000 m ur
ders at their hands. Aylwin pre
sented the re p o rt with an
im passioned appeal for justice,
and about 210 o f the cases were
forwarded to the courts. But most
cannot be prosecuted because o f a
1978 amnesty law, and hum an
rights lawyers expect the others to
be overturned by h ig h er courts,
still dom inated by Pinochet-era
appointees.
T he one likely case with any
chance o f success stems from the
1976 car-bomb assassination of
O rlando Letelier, a form er foreign
m inister u n d er Marxist president
Salvador Allende. H alf a dozen
m en have been convicted in the
killing, b u t C hile’s suprem e court
refused to try or extradite the intel
ligence officials who allegedly or
d ered it. In August 1991 a C uban
exile from Florida confessed to
being the trigger m an, an d a new
high court justice ord ered the case
reopened. Still, many Chileans
d o u b t the governm ent will pursue
the case to its full consequences
an d challenge P inochet’s form ida
ble form er secret police chief,
G eneral M anuel Contreras.

O n the whole, hum an rights
seem to have degenerated from a
noble cause to a political head
ache— an o th er “bargaining chip”
for the executive to use in its deli
cate power-balancing act with the
conservative establishm ent. Despite
his personal compassion, Aylwin’s
clear priority is political peace, and
so far he has n o t been willing to
risk a serious attack on either the
civilian o r military right.
T o a large extent, Aylwin’s
hands are tied—both by the num er
ous authoritarian laws enacted by
the form er regim e, and by the fact
th at Pinochet, who stepped down
as p resident in M arch 1990, re
m ains com m ander o f a large,
m odern army th at he has sworn to
pro tect from civilian “interfer
en ce.” U n d er the 1980 constitu
tion, the 76-year-old general can
rem ain in this position for an o th er
six years.
By many accounts, C hile’s mili
tary establishm ent rem ains ex
trem ely suspicious o f civilian
authorities. Form al relations are
correct, and the few times Pinochet
has attem pted to overstep the
bounds o f military authority, Ayl
win has firmly resisted. But u n d er
neath, many officers are angry at
civilian attem pts to control the
arm ed forces an d defiant over
abuses com m itted in the nam e o f a
patriotic, anticom m unist mission.
“T here is a fundam ental mis
trust,” says Cristian Labbe, a retired
colonel and form er close aide to
Pinochet. “T he governm ent
d o esn ’t understan d us military
m en. W hen they try to push us
aro u n d it has the opposite effect.
W hen one o f us is attacked or in
sulted, we all feel attacked.”
T he governm ent’s attem pt to
redress military abuses has also

been und erm in ed by an epidem ic
o f crime, several prison escapes,
and a num ber o f terrorist killings
blam ed on ultra-leftist groups. The
April 1,1991, slaying o f Jaim e
Guzman, C hile’s leading conserva
tive senator, shocked the nation
and forced the governm ent, which
had freed a num ber o f leftist pris
oners early on, to step up anti
terrorist tactics.

Human rights seem
to have degenerated
from a noble cause to
a political headache—
another “bargaining
chip” against
the conservative
establishment.
T he progressive ruling coalition
is fu rth er ham strung by the re
strictive political laws p u t in place
before P inochet’s departure. Onefourth o f the senate was appointed
u n d e r military rule, as were alm ost
all o f C hile’s 300 mayors, and
electoral regulations were skewed
to favor conservative districts and
tickets. Rightist legislators can effec
tively veto any governm ent pro
posal, requiring its supporters to
constantly engage in deal-making.
As one frustrated congressm an
said, Chile has becom e a “dem oc
racy o f forced accords.”
For its part, the public has
shown far m ore concern about
concrete econom ic and social prob
lems than abstract issues o f justice.
Despite five years o f steady eco

nom ic growth, about one-third o f
the populace rem ains below the
poverty level, an d desperation has
coincided with the en d o f a repres
sive police state to produce a verita
ble boom in thievery. In a recent
survey, 16% o f Santiago residents
said their hom es had been b u r
glarized.

Setting a New Agenda
While Chilean officials congratu
late themselves on achieving the
near-perfect transition, critics say
the governm ent is failing to con
front these and a host o f o th er
problem s, such as the n eed for con
stitutional and judicial reform , the
so-called “social d e b t” to those who
suffered economically u n d er
Pinochet, and the necessity o f re
ducing the size and autonom y o f
the military establishm ent.
By defining itself as a transition
governm ent and stressing the need
for consensus above all else, Aylw in’s adm inistration may have for
feited a unique opportunity to
make changes essential to consoli
dating democracy. Aylwin, though
a figure o f im peccable m oral au
thority, has cast his presidency in a
deliberately lim ited role, refusing
suggestions to extend his four-year
term an d leaving m ost divisive is
sues for his successor.
As critics see it, C hile’s transi
tion is already safely past, and its
leaders m ust start acting with m ore
boldness and vision. “A govern
m ent th at inaugurates a regim e
cannot avoid being foundational,”
writes social scientist M anuel Anto
nio G arreton in a recent essay.
‘T h is is n o t an abstract debate.
Pragm atism and minim alism are
n o t ju st strategies—they are ideo
logical options.” ■

Hemisphere • Fall 1991

Reports: Bolivia

Bolivia: The Psychology of Drug War
by Raul Barrios Moron

Raul Barrios Moron is a researcher at
the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), in Bolivia. He
is the author o/’Bolivia y Estados Unidos: Democracia, Derechos Hum anos y N arcotrafico (1980-1982) (La
Paz: Hisbol-FLACSO, 1989).
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Coca-Producing Regions

Rene Ramos

sychological operations”
are an integral part o f socalled low-intensity warfare. By m eans o f such
operations a cam paign’s
organizers direct persua
sive messages at target sectors o f a
population, according to the loca
tion an d the im portance o f those
sectors in an actual o r potential
conflict. In light o f the cam paign’s
political goals, the purpose o f psy
chological operations is to modify
the attitudes, beliefs, and em otions
o f a target audience by m anipulat
ing images, symbols, and infor
m ation.
In theory, psychological opera
tions motivate allies, dem oralize
the enemy, an d mobilize the sup
p o rt o f neutral parties. Against the
stark backdrop o f military technol
ogy and tactics, they are geared to
w inning hearts and minds. Indeed,
the priority o f low-intensity warfare
is to sow the political seeds o f vic
tory before setting foot o nto the
military field o f battle.
In the 1990s the US governm ent
has defined the coca-producing re
gions o f Bolivia as fertile terrain for
low-intensity warfare. T he strategic
objectives o f the Bush adm inistra
tion coincide with its post-Cold
War definition o f the A ndean re
gion as a hem ispheric security
zone, owing mainly to the illegal
trafficking o f cocaine.

Bolivia as War Zone
With the US governm ent’s finan
cial support and technical backing,
the Bolivian army recently began
psychological warfare operations to
com bat cocaine production as well
as associated terrorism and subver
sion. Army com m anders are par
ticularly concerned about two
issues: the presence o f Colom bian
drug traffickers in Bolivia’s zones
o f coca-paste production and com

m erce, and the possible incursion
by P eru ’s Sendero Luminoso into
Bolivia’s b o rd er areas. They regard
these as “nonconventional” ex
ternal threats that justify the
strengthening o f the military es
tablishm ent. So, evidently, does
the Bush adm inistration, which
boosted US military assistance to
Bolivia from $5.8 m illion in 1989 to
$40.7 million in 1991.
This political clim ate represents
a crucial opportunity for the Boliv-

ian army to recoup its form er au
thority in m atters o f internal secu
rity, which has d eteriorated since
the transition to dem ocracy began
in 1982. C ontributing to the
military’s renew ed sense o f mission
and indispensability has been the
institutional breakdow n o f the po
lice, caused by widespread drugrelated corruption.
As a reflection o f the new mili
tary outlook, the Bolivian army
established in 1990 what it calls
Departamento III de Operaciones Psicologicas. Departamento ///fo rm u lates
strategy for com bating d rug traffick
ing, which it identifies as “the prin
cipal th reat to Bolivia’s national
security.” T he form al context of

this strategy was the signing, on
May 7, 1990, o f A nnex III to the
1987 US-Bolivian bilateral antidrug
agreem ent, u n d er which President
Jaim e Paz Zam ora agreed to o rd er
the Bolivian army into the war on
drugs. T he new role o f psychologi
cal operations is thus to create a
social climate that paves the way
for the inevitable entry o f military
units into the vast theater o f coun
terdrug operations. W hat, however,
are the im plications o f this strategy
for civil-military relations in the
setting o f Bolivia’s efforts at
dem ocratization?
Relevant to this question are two
objectives o f “drug war” psychologi
cal operations. First, they replace

the police with the military, th ere
by militarizing Bolivia’s task o f
m aintaining internal security. Sec
ond, in so doing they redefine the
n atio n ’s territory as a war zone,
thereby im posing tight restrictions
on the expression o f public opin
ion. In the latter respect, the
strategy constructs dichotom ous
categories o f reference—for exam 
ple, that eith er you support the
m ilitarization o f counterdrug o p er
ations or you support the drug traf
fickers.
T he political construction of
such dichotom ies is tan tam o u n t to
discrediting the critics o f the milita
rization program . Thus authorities
explained the protest m arches by

Military drug-war poster
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campesinos in mid-1991 as the prod
uct o f a conspiracy by intransigent
u n io n leaders, opposition parties
and nongovernm ental organiza
tions, an d drug traffickers. The
official rhetoric o f polarization implicidy defines the military’s anti
d ru g role as essential to Bolivia’s
national security. T he underlying
message is th at only the military
can guarantee the n atio n ’s survival
against the d ru g trad e’s subversive
impact. In this respect, psychologi
cal operations seek to impose,
ra th e r than negotiate, political
consensus.
T he Paz Zam ora adm inistration
is evasive w hen asked how Bolivia’s
tenuous dem ocracy could possibly
survive the escalation o f social con
flict that is likely to occur— above
all in rural zones— if the military
assumes the police’s role o f m ain
taining dom estic security. T he key
question is w hether the country’s
political parties, social groups, exec
utive branch, and congress will
prove capable o f tightening the
reins on the military.

Propagandizing the Countryside
A few o f Bolivia’s coca-producing
regions, such as C hulum ani in the
Yungas Valley o f La Paz, have been
blanketed by the propaganda of
psychological operations. Part of
these operations is the dissemi
nation o f a poster titled “P or un
m anana m ejor” (“For a B etter To
m orrow ”). T he poster’s graphic
co n ten t depicts two antagonistic
worlds. O n the one side lies a fu
ture o f peace, prosperity, patriot
ism, an d tradition represented by
an un arm ed soldier smiling at a
hopeful campesino couple. O n the
o th er side lies the apparent alter
native: the darkness, disorder, and
alien ways o f the present. T he orga
nization responsible for the poster
is n o t indicated, undoubtedly a re
flection o f the arm y’s lack o f credi
bility am ong campesinos.
T he poster conveys an unequiv
ocal u nderstanding o f the mili
tary’s self-appointed role. An
unarm ed soldier occupies center
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stage, in a tutelary, paternalistic,
an d trustworthy spirit, pointing the
way for a respectful campesino m an
and woman. H e guides them away
from a netherw orld o f evil and selfdestruction and toward a m odern
izing rural life whose bedrock
values are Catholic and patriotic.
Illum inated by a radiant sun, the fu
ture setting revolves aro u n d a m an
and tractor at work in a field, sur
ro u n d e d by a bridge, modern-style
campesino houses, a church, and
the Bolivian flag. T he latter gener
ously displays the national b a n n e r’s
colors o f red, yellow, and green,
thus extending a sense o f citizen
ship to the countryside. In spite of
the Catholic C hurch’s strong anti
m ilitarization voice, the poster
portrays the C hurch as giving its
blessing to the arm y’s antidrug war.
No less im portant, the poster as
serts the Bolivian—as opposed to
US— origins o f the antidrug cam
paign.
This attem pt at symbolic fusion
between Bolivia’s arm ed forces and
campesinos is rem iniscent o f the
military-campesino pact o f 1961-74,
which sustained the p erio d ’s au
thoritarian governm ents. H ence
the poster reflects an attem pt to
resurrect an old anticom m unist
alliance in a new political setting.
In so doing the arm ed forces are
following a strategy o f psychologi
cal operations to m anipulate the
vulnerabilities o f the target audi-

UKC

ence. Against a backdrop o f ex
trem e rural poverty, Bolivian coca
producers face a dual econom ic vul
nerability: the price instability o f
the coca/cocaine m arket and their
lack o f production competitive
ness. To many campesinos—who,
after all, tu rn ed to coca production
in the first place because o f the
absence o f viable econom ic alterna
tives— the military’s rural develop
m ent program s may ap p ear to be
the only guarantee o f econom ic
survival and progress.
D evelopm ent program s, as sym
bolized by the tractor an d bridge
in the poster, are certainly n o t new
to military cam paigns in the Boliv
ian countryside. W hat the poster
warns, however, is th at Bolivia’s
c u rren t rural developm ent p ro 
gram , Desarrollo Altemativo, seems
to have becom e a m ere com ple
m ent for an incipient cam paign of
low-intensity warfare. T he points of
reference for this campaign are the
A ndean nexus with post-Cold War
geopolitics and the perm anence of
extrem e poverty in Bolivia. In real
ity, it is n o t drug trafficking but
ra th e r the com bination o f Bolivia’s
extrem e poverty and the strategic
im positions o f the US d ru g war
that pose the principal th reat to
Bolivian national security and the
consolidation o f democracy. ■
(Translated by H em isphere staff)
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Mexico: Free Trade and Ecology
byJan Gilbreath Rich
i

ree-trade negotiations
They have significantly increased
their pollution-m onitoring person
have spurred a transform ation in M exico’s Secrenel, closed 350 industries over a
taria de Desarrollo Urbanoy
three-m onth period for pollution
Ecologia (SEDUE), which
violations, and have finalized an
has been frequently criti
agreem ent with the W orld Bank to
cized bo th in Mexico an d abroadprovide $100 million for new
for its inability to m onitor indusSEDUE financing.
trial pollution.
As concerns have surfaced b oth
in Mexico and in the US Congress
over the environm ental im pact o f a
Mexican officials deny
N orth Am erican free-trade agree
m ent, SEDUE officials have begun
that the abrupt
to revam p th eir environm ental
program s and look for new inter
improvements stem
national funds to finance them . At
the same time, SEDUE began what
from US debate over
may be the agency’s m ost signif
the possibility of
icant crackdown on industrial
polluters.
worsened pollution
SEDUE officials deny th at their
ab ru p t im provem ents em anate
under a free-trade
from the US public debate over the
possibility o f w orsening industrial
agreement.
pollution u n d e r a free-trade agree
m ent, b u t they acknowledge that
th eir som etim es-beleaguered
agency is experiencing a m etam or
Jjjjp
phosis. Sergio Reyes Lujan, SEDUE
These changes, however, do not
undersecretary for environm ental
make SEDUE a m odern, effective
program s, says, “We have every in
agency. T he new personnel, for ex
tention to change o u r situation
am ple, will enhance what has only
and the political will to do so.”
been a token gesture in pollution
Over the past few m onths,
control. U ntil m ore than 50 new
SEDUE officials have m et every
pollution inspectors were added to
week with their US counterparts in
its staff in 1991, SEDUE had less
the Environm ental Protection
than a dozen inspectors for b o rd er
Agency (EPA) to form an environ
industries in the four-state area
m ental m anagem ent plan for the
bordering Texas.
2,000-mile US-Mexican border.
M oreover, SEDUE’s budget
rem ains small by EPA standards.
In 1990 the agency only had about
Jan Gilbreath Rich is an environmental
$3.15 m illion for all pollution con
policy specialist at the Lyndon Baines
trol program s in Mexico. Such
Johnson School o f Public Affairs, Uni
funding represents a m ere fraction
versity of Texas at Austin. Her publica
o f a single US state agency budget
tions include “Bordering on Trouble, ”
for pollution control. But the new
E nvironm ental Forum (1991).
W orld Bank funds, o th er loans

r

SEDUE is seeking, an d the new
personnel indicate th at SEDUE is
going to get tough with b oth do
mestic and foreign industries in
Mexico, Reyes Lujan says. “If some
industry goes in the w rong direc
tion, we are going to close it,”
he claims.

Skepticism
Reyes L ujan’s prom ises m eet with
skepticism, however, from M exico’s
environm ental community. “Plant
closings tapered down dramatically
after the US Congress approved
fast-track p rocedures,” says Betty
Ferber de Aridjis, spokeswoman for
the G roup o f 100, one o f M exico’s
m ost p rom inent environm ental
groups. “T here is still a woefully in
adequate budget and there are still
n o t enough [plant] inspections.”
Environm entalists are equally
concerned with their inability to ob
tain inform ation on SEDUE’s
plans. T he lack o f a right-to-know
law in Mexico allows the agency to
operate in relative secrecy, com
plains Aridjis. “It makes it difficult
to get accurate inform ation or,
sometimes, any inform ation,” she
says.
EPA officials, however, are de
lighted at the changes in SEDUE.
T he agency’s transform ation is
m entioned frequently by US offi
cials touting the long-awaited reso
lution o f b o rd er environm ental
issues. In the same spirit o f cooper
ation, the US governm ent has
begun to make new offers o f tech
nical assistance to SEDUE and to
offer some new funding, although
no loans o r grants have b een forth
com ing. T he EPA recently agreed
to give SEDUE about $150,000 for
a program on greenhouse gases,
for exam ple, b u t has yet to pro-
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duce funds to help SEDUE carry
o u t the jo in t b o rd e r m anagem ent
plan—now in its fifth draft.

Initiative of Its Own
SEDUE is showing initiative o f its
own, however, by negotiating for a
loan o f $165,000 to shore up
agency infrastructure. At the same
time, it is forcing dom estic and for
eign industries to sign new agree
m ents lim iting toxic air an d water
emissions in com pliance with tech
nical regulations unfolding u n d er
M exico’s om nibus environm ental
act o f 1988. Such agreem ents are a
long-standing tradition in Mexican
governm ent, and they are fre
quently criticized for being both
voluntary and unenforceable.
SEDUE has p u t teeth into the
agreem ents, though, by forcing
com panies to post bonds based on
the total investm ent prom ised by
the com pany for pollution abate
m en t program s.
Plant shutdowns have also
sparked some new fears am ong for
eign industries operating in Mex
ico. W hen SEDUE recently shut
down a G eneral M otors (GM)
plant in M atam oros for 12 days,
the auto giant was forced to stop
some global car production, Reyes
said. As a result, GM has agreed to
build new waste-water treatm ent
facilities at 34 plants, he said.
SEDUE and the EPA are also dis
cussing the idea o f assessing user
fees against b o rd er industries that
would by channeled into a “green
fu n d ,” to be used for m onitoring
b o rd er pollution and building in
frastructure im provem ent projects.
Maquiladoras, now considered cost
ra th e r than profit centers, pay only
negligible taxes to Mexico. A legal
framework to allow such user fees
has already been established in
Mexican law, Reyes says. U nder
new regulations that becam e effec
tive in O ctober 1991, even parastate industries can be charged
such fees, he said.
SEDUE’s new financial and tech
nical resources, and the coopera
tive effort with the EPA, will allow
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Mexico for the first time to assess
its overall b o rd e r pollution prob
lems and the cost o f resolving
them , Reyes believes. Yet, US and
Mexican environm ental groups
warn th at if attention is n o t con
tinually focused on natural re
source issues in US-Mexican trade
relations, bo th SEDUE and the

EPA will have less incentive to
m aintain their present m om entum
and follow through on an effective
b o rd er m anagem ent plan. ■
Editor’s Note: Adapted with permission
from El Financiero Internacional
(Mexico City), August 26, 1991.
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Reports: Memoriam

In Memoriam: Gordon K. Lewis
by Anthony P. Maingot

he lecturer could barely
look over the five-foot
high lectern. All that
could be seen o f his head
were thick bifocals and
long hair p in n ed in the
back with bobby pins. His lectures,
in English, always seem ed to go
over the heads o f his few and
mostly Spanish-speaking students.
T o this student, fresh from four
years o f com petent b u t ideologi
cally uniform US education, his lec
tures were eye-openers. They were
a challenge to critical thinking as
well as a call to jo in action to
thought.
This was in 1961 at the Universidad de Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras,
an intellectual oasis in the Carib
bean led by Jaim e Benitez, one of
th at extraordinary generation of
m en who had helped Luis Munoz
M arin transform the island. The
Universidad de Puerto Rico was also a
bit o f a sanctuary for the disen
franchised population o f a bland
US academ ic environm ent, such as
ethnic and racial m inorities, gays,
an d those who, like G ordon K.
Lewis, were victims o f Senator
Jo sep h M cCarthy’s philistine reign
o f ideological terror. To be sure,
P uerto Rico also had constraints
on academ ic freedom . Lewis would
deal with these in his usual devas
tating style in his m ost im portant
book, Puerto Rico: Freedom, and Power
in the Caribbean (1965). T he univer
sity’s req u irem en t that any political
activities on cam pus n o t be parti
san, wrote Lewis, “is rath er like re
questing a system o f m arriage
w ithout sex.”

T

Anthony P. Maingot is editor of
H em isphere.

Lewis was passionately partisan:
he was a lifelong Fabian and also a
lifelong Christian. In the pursuit of
an understanding o f C aribbean re
alities, both belief systems took on
distinctly radical tones. H e infused
those systems, n o t merely with an
astonishing knowledge o f the his
tory o f hum an frailties, b u t with a
capacity for m oral indignation.

While he was Welsh by birth, he
was intellectually from the Carib
bean. H e was firmly a p art o f those
societies and cultures that, having
had to build from the vile rubble o f
slavery, developed in the process a
low threshold o f tolerance for injus
tice and exploitation. Because such
a stance is never w ithout in n er ten
sions and contradictions, Lewis
could not escape these either. H e
was, for instance, always critical o f
the P uerto Rican “Estado Libre Asociado" status, bu t at the same time a
great adm irer o f its fundam ental
architect, M unoz Marin. H e intrin

sically disliked the Leninist variety
o f socialism b u t adm ired its m ost
fervent C aribbean practitioner,
Fidel Castro.
In his Main Currents in Caribbean
Thought (1983), Lewis condem ns
the C aribbean as an intrinsically
racist region, yet concludes th at if
racial dem ocracy is to be created
anywhere it will be there. Perhaps
Lewis in 1983 was clinging to hopes
th at everyday experience was prov
ing to be misplaced. This hope was
perhaps m ost directly expressed in
1969 in his The Growth of the Modem
West Indies. T he correct p ath for
the West Indies, said Lewis, was “a
socialist ideology so that the nation
alist ethic may be m arried to the
planned organization o f social
equality.” Alas, the C aribbean—
an d the world—is going in the
opposite direction.
Lewis was n o t one to fly with the
flock o r assert the popular view.
Yet his willingness to dismiss “prag
m atic considerations,” “public opin
ion,” “majority consent,” o r “m ere
utilitarian advantage” certainly did
n o t represent his general view on
the C aribbean, whose m ajoritarian
dem ocracy Lewis m ore often than
n o t applauded an d prom oted.
H ere, then, was G ordon K.
Lewis, Welsh b u t also Caribbean;
socialist b u t also the grand teacher
o f the philosophy o f E dm und
Burke, British parliam entary prin
ciples, and the Am erican founding
fathers. A com plex m an o f many
nuances but, above all, unequivo
cally engaged.
T he C aribbean has lost its most
com plete representative o f the in
tellectual enterprise. It is left, fortu
nately, with the literary legacy o f
th at enterprise. Those who, like
this student, learned from him , will
sorely miss him. ■
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Insider briefs on people and institutions
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs

. . . But We Can Still Be
Friends . . .
A m inor tiff developed between
Brazilian authorities and General
Motors do Brasil. T he dispute
eru p ted when the Sao-Paulo-based
vice president for GM’s Latin Amer
ican operations, R obert B. Stone,
an n o u n ced on May 28,1991, his re
tirem ent an d pending replacem ent
by R ichard C. N erod, president of
GM’s Mexico operations. N erod
sent a strong message to Brazil’s
governm ent by announcing that
GM’s regional headquarters would
move from Sao Paulo to Miami.
According to a GM spokesperson,
“p o o r com m unications between
Brazil an d o th er South Am erican
countries” was one o f the m ajor rea
sons for the shift in corporate head
quarters. GM indicated, however,
th at its plans to invest m ore than
$1 billion in Brazil would n o t be
altered.

Cholera Update
C holera has now appeared in US
waters— in Mobile Bay. How the dis
ease found its way to the Gulf of
Mexico and into A labam a’s oysters
rem ains a mystery. T he cause may
have been contam inated sewage
du m p ed by a ship carrying infected
workers from South America. O r a
Food and Drug Adm inistration lab
adjacent to Mobile Bay may have
accidentally released the bacteria.
Meanwhile, health authorities have
posted signs to keep boaters and
swimmers away from the shellfish
shoals.

Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg
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It’s All in the Body Language

Best Seller #1

N o substantive agreem ents on the
N orth American free-trade agree
m ent were reached at the Seattle
m eeting (August 19-20, 1991) of
trade negotiators representing
C anada, the US, and Mexico.
T here were, however, some sub
stantive disagreem ents. T he m ost
notable occurred when M exico’s
com m erce secretary, Jaim e Serra
Puche, corrected a US State D epart
m ent translator on three occasions
and offered his own translation of
the press conference’s final ques
tion. According to the Mexican offi
cial, the translator was giving the
forum ’s questions a m ore con
frontational m eaning than was in
ten d ed by the Mexican journalists,
who were directing them at US
trade negotiator Carla Hills.

Venezuelan au th o r A rturo Uslar
Pietri donated, in August 1991,
$16,000 from the Premio de Novela
Romulo Gallegos to the V enezuelan
educational institute, Fey Alegria.
Uslar Pietri received the prize for
his novel, La visita en el tiempo.
U pon m aking the gift, the au th o r
declared th at education is Vene
zuela’s “m ost im portant, dram atic
and fundam ental problem .” H e ob
served that “with all the m oney we
spend, we d o n ’t have in V enezuela
education that emphasizes the
country’s needs” (AgenceFrance
Presse, August 15,1991).

W e’ve Heard This Before
A ccording to Echoes from Eco-Tours,
a Panam anian newsletter, Pana
m a’s “best kept secret” is the
country’s accessible rain forests.
F ounded by Howard Wenzel, a US
expatriate in Panam a, Eco-Tours de
Panama S.A. is dedicated to nature
and adventure tourism. T he new
eco-enterprise has a special agree
m ent with the Sm ithsonian T ropi
cal Research Institute to ru n the
“Panam a Canal R ainforest Adven
tu re.” According to the newsletter,
the “thrill o f passing large ocean
liners and gigantic container ships
in the Canal in a small boat, com 
bined with the observation o f m on
keys, turtles, tropical birds and
oth er fauna and flora in the teem 
ing ra in fo re st. . . make this trip
one o f the m ost unique an d enjoy
able jungle tours in the w orld.”

Slow Flow in the Bayou State
Louisiana governor Buddy R oem er
has published “Closing the Busi
ness Gap with Latin A m erica,” a
b lueprint for the Bayou state’s new
international trade strategy. Accord
ing to the August 1991 report, the
state’s “molasses m entality” and the
absence o f inform ation for small
firms have been m ajor im pedi
m ents to the growth o f trade be
tween Louisiana and Latin
America.

Mixed Message
The G uatem alan governm ent, n o t
known for its friendly treatm en t of
its indigenous population, is now
m arketing the music o f Guate
m ala’s native groups. A project
directed by the Instituto Guatemalteco de Turismo is recording an d dis
tributing the music o f 24 native
groups, including the som ber
sounds o f the Kekchi Indians and
the reggae rhythm s o f Black Caribs.

Environmental Music

Who Is Gaspar Morn?

Milton Nascimento, considered by
many to be Brazil’s leading popu
lar musician, has tu rn ed his at
tention to the country’s festering
debate over the environm ent. He
has released a new album , TXAI
(Colum bia R ecords), which in the
language o f the Kaxinawa Indians
m eans “the o th er h alf o f m e.” T he
album interprets the threats to the
Brazilian rain forest and the in
digenous groups who live there.
T he album includes b rief segm ents
o f music from A m azonian tribes,
juxtaposed with N ascim ento’s
usual mix o f jazz and rock. Ac
cording to Times of the Americas
(August 21, 1991), the indigenous
sounds are the “real soul o f the
recording.”

Many know G aspar Ilom as the
hero o f Men of Maize, N obel laure
ate Miguel Angel Asturias’s novel
o f Mayan life in C entral America.
In recent times, “Gaspar Ilom ” has
been the nom de guerre o f a
leader o f the Organization Revolucionaria del Pueblo en Armas, one o f
G uatem ala’s antigovernm ent insur
gencies. T he person beh in d the
nam e is actually R odrigo Asturias,
the oldest son o f the elder Asturias.

Castro’s Future
T he alm ost breathless pace of
changes in the USSR and Eastern
E urope raises the inevitable ques
tion ab out Cuba: How m uch
longer can Fidel Castro m aintain
his power? A 1991 Freedom House
publication, “Cuba in the N ine
ties,’’ provides insight into the issue
th rough analyses by leading ob
servers o f C uban affairs, including
Senator Claiborne Pell, Jorge
Dom inguez, Wayne Smith, Luis
Aguilar, Irving Louis Horowitz, and
C arm elo Mesa-Lago. T he magazinelength publication is one o f the
first docum ents to be published by
“T he Cuba R oundtable,” organized
by Freedom House to provide a
forum for the discussion o f cu rren t
developm ents in Cuba and their im
pact on US-Cuban relations.

Jet-Set Migrants
Miami has becom e a m ecca for
Latin A m erican pop stars, who are
now establishing residences in the
South Florida city. Am ong those
who periodically call Miami hom e
are V enezuelan singer Jose Luis
R odriguez (“El P um a”), Nicara
guan salsa singer Luis Enrique,
A rgentine balladeer M aria M arta
Serra Lima, an d Dom inican
fo lk /m eren g u e star Ju an Luis
G uerra. They jo in Spanish super
stars Palom a San Basilio an d Julio
Iglesias, who also reside in Miami.

Best Seller #2
O ne o f the hottest books in Mexico
is Elena Poniatowska’s Todo Mexico
(Mexico, DF: Editorial Diana,
1990). T he text is a collection o f in
terviews conducted by the renown
Mexican au th o r with notable per
sonalities from the world o f His
panic affairs, including Spain’s
m ost fam ous bullfighter, M anuel
Benitez, “El C ordobes”;Jorge Luis
Borges, the A rgentine writer; and
the acclaim ed film m aker Luis
Bunuel, a Spaniard who took

Mexican citizenship. A lthough the
interviews are somewhat dated,
they once again reveal Ponia
towska’s rich interviewing skills.

Watch Out
T he Sm ithsonian Institution is now
publishing New World, a quincen
tenary publication “dedicated to
the Am ericas.” T he newsletter
mixes scholarly analysis with news
notes on cultural activities th at are
being scheduled around the 500th
anniversary o f C olum bus’s arrival
in the Caribbean. Volum e two of
the publication provides in-depth
analyses o f C olum bus’s im pact
from the African-American p er
spective through essays by Franklin
W. Knight, a jo h n s H opkins Univer
sity historian, an d Sydney M arch, a
Jam aican poet who edits the Conti
nent, a W ashington-based AfricanAm erican news publication.

Worth Visiting
T he M onterrey M useum o f Con
tem porary Art o p en ed its doors on
Ju n e 29, 1991, with an exhibit th at
displayed 300 works by 62 artists
from 17 countries. T he $11-million
project is symbolic o f M exico’s
em erging role as a m ediator and
in terp reter between Latin Am erica
and the US.

On the Move
Richard Nuccio, form erly o f the
Inter-Am erican Dialogue, is now
on the staff o f the H ouse Subcom 
m ittee on W estern H em isphere Af
fairs. Nuccio replaces long-time
staffer Nancy Agris.
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Restructuring Argentina
by William C. Smith

Carlos Menem’s neoliberal policies have achieved short-term success in
tranquilizing Argentina’s raging inflation. But can his program of “creative
destruction”reverse the economy’s long-term structural decline?

arlos Saul M enem as
sum ed the presidency on
July 8, 1989, with Argen
tina obsessed by raging
hyperinflation. From Au
gust 1988 through July
1989, consum er prices soared
3,610% and wholesale prices
5,062%. M enem responded with
radical, neoliberal “free-m arket” re
forms that explicitly repudiated the
populist and statist econom ic postu
lates defended by Peronism since
the 1940s. Indicative o f changes to
com e, key m em bers o f the presi
dential entourage grandly spoke of
a “new bloc o f social, political, eco
nom ic, and perhaps military
pow er,” whose task was nothing
less than the “reconstruction o f Ar
gentine capitalism .” M enem him 
self expressed the intention to
“pulverize the crisis.” H e w arned
his fellow citizens to brace them 
selves for “a tough, costly, an d se
vere adjustm ent,” requiring “m ajor
surgery w ithout anesthesia.” How
ever vivid the language, the new
president was n o t exaggerating the

C

William C. Smith is associate professor
of political science at the University of
Miami. He is the author of A uthoritar
ianism an d the Crisis o f the A rgen
tine Political Economy (Stanford
University Press, 1989).
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pain that would soon afflict A rgen
tine society.
The econom ic logic o f M enem ’s
neoliberal project is undeniable; its
social an d political viability, how
ever, rem ains highly problem atic.
A key issue concerns the changing
balance o f power between the exec
utive and legislative branches of
governm ent, on the one hand, and
between the state and the m ost in
ternationally com petitive sectors of
business, on the other. A nother
issue is the willingness o f the rest of
society—middle-class consum ers,
organized labor, the weaker, do
mestically o riented segm ents of
urban and rural business, and oth
ers— to shoulder the huge social
costs resulting from the shrinkage
o f the state’s econom ic role and
the “freeing” o f the market.

Menem’s “Productive
Revolution”
T he thrust o f M enem ’s “productive
revolution” was first revealed in the
“Plan BB,” nam ed after Bunge &
Born, A rgentina’s m ost powerful
m ultinational corporation and, for
Peronism , long a reviled symbol of
vendepatria (“sell o u t”) capitalism.
Unveiled by Miguel Roig and
im plem ented by N estor Rapanelli,
his successor as econom y m inister,
the Plan BB consisted o f em er

gency m easures—such as a 170%
currency devaluation, 200-640%
hikes in public-sector tariffs, an d re
ductions in state subsidies—as well
as an am bitious b lu ep rin t for a new
m odel o f econom ic developm ent.
Steps toward this new m odel were
taken with congressional approval
o f a “revolutionary project” calling
for the rapid downsizing o f the
A rgentine state and the drastic de
regulation o f the country’s semi
closed econom y.
T he start was auspicious. T he
M enem governm ent’s image o f au
thority, com bined with positive
business expectations and con
sum er enthusiasm gen erated by
Peronism ’s conversion to neo
liberalism, quickly cooled the fires
of hyperinflation. T he Banco Cen
tral s foreign-exchange position
and the state’s fiscal situation im
proved dramatically, an d a simula
crum o f norm alcy was restored.
M acroeconom ic stability, however,
proved extrem ely fragile. T he fiscal
surplus was insufficient to cover
the Banco Central s escalating in
terest bill, an d the cycle o f publicsector borrow ing and dom estic
d ebt accum ulation proceeded
w ithout interruption.
By D ecem ber 1989 renew ed
currency speculation against the
austral forced Rapanelli to gam ble
on m ajor m odifications o f the

Plan BB, including a unilateral
m oratorium on the internal debt.
Public u p ro ar from entrepreneurs,
agrarian producers, organized
labor, and the political parties—
including the Peronists—forced
R apanelli’s resignation. His replace
m en t was A ntonio Erm an Gonza
lez, who had served as secretary o f
econom y o f La Rioja—A rgentina’s
poorest province—during the
1970s u n d e r th en provincial gov
ern o r Carlos M enem.
C onfronted by rising inflation,
renew ed speculation, and the
th reat o f a ru n on the banks,
E rm an Gonzalez announced the
“B onex Plan,” whose centerpiece
was the com pulsory conversion o f
com m ercial bank time deposits
greater than 1 million australes
(slightly m ore than $500) into tenyear, dollar-denom inated bonds
paying 6% annual interest. This
unilateral action wiped ou t most
o f th e public-sector’s short-term
dom estic debt, replacing it with
m edium -term external debt.
By causing a sharp reduction in
the n atio n ’s liquidity, the Bonex
Plan exacerbated A rgentina’s al
ready steep recession. Yet the dol
lar co ntinued to rise, a problem
com pounded w hen the Interna
tional M onetary Fund (IMF)
suspended the release o f funds
u n d e r an earlier agreem ent. De
spite the governm ent’s prom ises of
d eep en ed austerity, W ashington
deem ed th at A rgentina had m ade
insufficient progress to be included
in the debt renegotiations envi
sioned u n d e r the Brady Plan.
This difficult scenario set the
stage for what the Buenos Aires
financial new spaper AmbitoFinanciero baptized as a “m arket coup”
responsible for a new ro u n d o f viru
len t hyperinflation. For the 12

m onths ending in M arch 1990, the
consum er price index had risen a
phenom enal 20,594%.
Yet an o th er em ergency package
was decreed to bring the madly
careening econom y u n d e r a sem
blance o f control. Relying on a
strong fiscal shock, the m easures
enacted by Erm an Gonzalez and
his team checked hyperinflation
and im proved public finances,
albeit at the expense o f public
services, including education and
the judicial system.

Yet another emergency
measure was decreed
to bring the madly
careening economy
under a semblance of
control, based on a
strongfiscal shock.

With the th reat o f hyperinfla
tion receding somewhat, the
M enem governm ent concentrated
on advancing its neoliberal agenda
o f dism antling the interventionist
state and opening the econom y to
the rigors o f international com
petition. In July 1990 Erm an Gon
zalez enacted liberalizing m easures
to deregulate im ports and elimi
nate protectionist m easures benefiting local industry. In August the
Ministerio deEconomia was given
broad new powers to accelerate the

privatization a n d /o r liquidation of
the state’s largest enterprises. In
O ctober M enem went further, sign
ing a decree m andating the privati
zation within six m onths o f many
state-owned com panies, such as
the YPF petroleum company, Gas
del Estado, Segba, Agua y Energia,
Obras Sanitarias, the post office,
an d the p o rt adm inistration. C on
tracts to private com panies were
aw arded for secondary oil an d natu
ral gas exploration. N ot even the
military-industrial com plex was to
be spared in this privatizing frenzy,
as m any industries belonging to
the holding com pany Fabricaciones
Militares were slated for transfer to
private ownership.
Privatization was plagued with
m ultiple difficulties. Critics alleged
that hasty privatization favored the
powerful grupos economicos (e.g.,
Perez Com panc, Bunge & Born,
T echint, Pescarm oma, Acindar,
Celulosa A rgentina, Bridas) with
huge u n earn ed profits. The
privatization drive was m arred by
considerable im provisation, if n o t
by dow nright incom petence. Com
pounding these problem s was the
failure to p u t a regulatory fram e
work into place before com panies
such as Aerolm eas A rgentinas and
ENTEL, the telecom m unications
m onopoly, were placed on the
auction block.
Meanwhile, increasingly harsh
anti-inflation policies p lunged the
econom y into “hyper-recession.”
D eindustrialization continued, as
did the contraction o f real wages.
Indeed, blue-collar industrial wages
were now sufficient to acquire only
40% o f the m arket basket o f basic
goods an d services, while u nem 
ploym ent and underem ploym ent
surpassed the unp reced en ted m ark
o f 17%.
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T he M enem governm ent
greeted this dismal econom ic news
with equanim ity, even suggesting
th at massive social dislocations
were positive signs that marketo rien ted policies were working.
T he only b rig h t spot was th at Ar
g en tin a’s 1990 trade surplus had
risen significantly. T he m ain rea
son for this rise, however, was the
collapse o f dom estic dem and and
investm ent, which p u t a dam per on
im ports. A nother reason was the se
vere overvaluation o f the austral,
caused mainly by tight m onetary
policy an d the hoarding o f dollars
by many firms to m eet their pay
rolls an d tax obligations.
By the e n d o f 1990 M enem ’s
neoliberal project found itself at a
dangerous impasse: despite the re
cession, inflation for the year sur
passed 1,800%. Nevertheless,
M enem and his econom ic team
chose to stay the course. In Decem
b er E rm an Gonzalez fu rth er liberal
ized foreign trade, im posed yet
a n o th er “deflationary shock,” and
approved a “tax am nesty” perm it
ting the repatriation o f “black” dol
lars w ithout fear o f legal penalties.
These improvisations, plus new
em ergency course corrections in
January 1991, touched off a specula
tive frenzy, causing the austral to
lose 50% o f its value against the
dollar.
M ounting scandals over corrup
tion in high places— such as the
“Swiftgate” affair in which US
am bassador T errence Todm an
accused high functionaries o f de
m anding payoffs from US m ultina
tionals— and the th reat o f an o th er
hyperinflationary spike set off a
tragicom ic ro u n d o f musical chairs.
W hen the dust settled, M enem ’s
new cabinet lineup saw D om ingo
Cavallo leave the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores to take over at the
em battled Ministerio de Economia. It
also saw G uido Di Telia, previously
A rgentina’s am bassador in Wash
ington, shift to Relaciones Exteriores,
and E rm an Gonzalez transfer to
the Ministerio deDefensa.
In M arch 1991 new economy
m inister Cavallo prescribed the ulti
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m ate in anti-inflation shock ther
apy: on April 1 the austral becam e
freely convertible into dollars. Fur
ther, the congress passed a new law
prohibiting the Banco Central from
printing m oney to cover budget
deficits unless new emissions were
fully backed by gold o r foreign cur
rency. To liberalize foreign trade
an d to make industry m ore com pet
itive, the governm ent slashed im
p o rt duties. A rgentina jo in e d
Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay in
form ing MERCOSUR (Mercado
Comun del Cono Sur) to bolster the
reg io n ’s bargaining power in nego
tiating a fram ework agreem ent
with the US concerning a possible
hem ispheric m egam arket.

Like poker players
betting the ranch,
Cavallo and Menem,
risked Argentina’s
$5.5 billion inforeign
reserves in a desperate
effort to halt inflation
in its tracks.

T he Cavallo Plan, as the new
package was dubbed, represented
the 13th m odification o f the neo
liberal m odel since M enem as
sum ed office. It was a dram atic
gam ble. Like poker players betting
the ranch, Cavallo and M enem
risked A rgentina’s approxim ately
$5.5 billion in foreign reserves in a
desperate effort to halt inflation in
its tracks. T he risks were as high as
the stakes: the “convertibility” com 
p o n e n t o f the Cavallo Plan m eant
that should wealthy A rgentines per
ceive th at the governm ent lacked
the will o r the hard-currency re
serves to m aintain the austral at
10,000 to the US dollar, they could

im mediately exchange their australes for dollars, leaving the Banco
Central s coffers empty.
T he A rgentine econom y was
already extensively “dollarized”:
the value o f greenbacks in circula
tion was estim ated to be greater
than the sum o f australes in the
hands o f the public an d on deposit
in the banking system. This fitct
gave the plan plausibility and
Cavallo a chance to achieve the
elusive goal o f reactivating at least
some econom ic sectors (e.g., agri
business and high value-added
m anufacturing industries capable
o f exporting) w ithout endangering
m onetary stabilization. But if this
latest version o f neoliberalism re
structuring were to b reathe life
into the prostrate A rgentine
economy, the state would have to
achieve a substantial and en d uring
fiscal surplus while also m aintain
ing a large trade surplus. An agree
m en t with A rgentina’s creditor
banks and the IMF to reduce ex
ternal d ebt service and to attract a
m odest flow o f overseas investm ent
capital was also imperative. All
these propositions were dubious
at best.
In sum M enem ’s aggressive anti
statist, pro-m arket policies accen
tuated the dism antling o f the
country’s industrial base th at had
gathered m om entum u n d er the
post-1976 military dictatorship and
continued unchecked u n d er Raul
Alfonsin after 1983. Despite draco
nian deflationary policies, prices
continued to rise at m oderately
high rates. M oreover the “hyper
stabilization” strategy resulted in
the worst recession in the history of
A rgentine industry.
T he consequences o f this reces
sion could be clearly seen in the
state’s fiscal policies. For example,
as recently as 1987 public-sector sal
aries represented 12% o f gross do
mestic pro d u ct (GDP), b u t recent
austerity policies (including the dis
missal o f 60,000 public employees
and pledges to trim thousands
m ore) have reduced this figure to
less than 6%. C urtailm ent o f publicsector investm ents triggered a vio-
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len t decline in the construction sec
to r (a m ajor em ployer o f unskilled
labor) an d in the strategic capital
goods sector. R educed expendi
ture, higher tax revenues, and prof
its from the sale o f state enterprises
resulted in small fiscal surpluses
th at have drastically reduced the
state’s absorption o f credit. While
the latter p u t downward pressure
on interest rates, prolonged re
cession m eant th at even m uch
cheaper credit was insufficient in
centive to reignite private-sector in
vestment. Stagnation continued,
with few hopes for quick econom ic
reactivation.
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Social Costs of Neoliberalism
M enem ’s em brace o f free-m arket
econom ic reform s jeopardized his
personal popularity an d threat
ened to underm ine the allegiance
o f Peronism ’s populist social base.
Neoliberalism also posed serious
questions about the future o f dem o
cratic consolidation. From the lofty
heights o f neoclassical econom ic
theory, the logic o f neoliberal re
structuring and the exigencies of
dem ocratic politics may have
seem ed com patible an d even
m utually reinforcing. At least in
the short run, however, M enem ’s

policies en g en d ered tension, con
flict, and contradiction.
T he industrial sector’s deep en 
ing crisis an d the continued shrink
age o f the dom estic m arket have
profound im plications for distribu
tive justice. GDP p er capita de
clined m ore than one-fourth
during the 1980s—regressing to
the figure reached aro u n d 1960—
with incom e inequalities worsening
as well. T he share o f national in
com e going to one-tenth o f the
population is about 46%, up
sharply from 35% in 1974. T he
poor are now estim ated as rep re
senting at least 30% o f the n atio n ’s
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population and m ore than 40% of
the population o f m etropolitan
B uenos Aires. N ot only have living
standards w orsened for the poorest
groups. In addition there has
em erged a category o f “new pau
p ers”—workers and middle-class
employees who form erly obtained
a reasonable standard o f living, but
who in recen t years have fallen into
poverty.
Prospects for econom ic stabili
zation and, m ore optimistically,
long-term growth hinge on the
em ergence o f an internationally
com petitive m odel o f developm ent
to replace the post-World War II
m odel o f im port-substitution indus
trialization. But Menemstroika re
structuring faces a m ajor political
obstacle— the dism antling o f the
populist coalition (long favored by
b oth Peronists and Radicals) of
business and labor interests tied to
the dom estic m arket. T he irony is
th at the M enem governm ent’s neo
liberalism has en countered signifi
cant opposition from within the
ranks o f the en trepreneurs them 
selves. In an effort to force the gov
ern m e n t to elim inate export taxes,
rural producers o f grains, vegeta
ble oils, and m eat have frequently
refused to exchange their foreign
currency at the Banco Central. M ean
while, industrialists producing both
consum er durable and nondurable
items have voiced misgivings about
the em phasis on agriculture and pe
troleum in the governm ent’s plans
to retu rn A rgentina to the ranks of
the w orld’s leading com m odity ex
porters. M ore generally, m any en 
trep ren eu rs fear that if the
econom y is o p en ed too rapidly,
and if state subsidies are slashed
too drastically, the private sector
will be sacrificed on the twin altars
o f international competitiveness
and fiscal austerity.
O rganized labor, which con
tinues u n d er Peronist hegem ony, is
an o th er key m em ber o f the popu
list coalition. Ultimately, the viabil
ity o f the neoliberal m odel will
hinge on the state leadership’s abil
ity to contain labor militancy, im
plem ent a restrictive wage policy,
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an d prom ote the “flexibilization”
o f the labor m arket by elim inating
rules favoring workers within en ter
prises. M enem ’s policies have pro
voked an open rift within the ranks
o f the Peronist labor m ovem ent.
T he officially recognized Confedera
tion General del Trabajo-San Martin
has given its grudging support to
M enem ’s policies; in contrast the
antigovernm ent CGT- Azopardo,
which includes many public-sector

Neoliberal
prescriptions callfor
rolling backing the
state’s role in the
economy and society.
Ironically, though,
they may well require
not less but more state
intervention.

employees and o th er m ilitant
unionists, has strongly opposed
plans for privatization and liberali
zation. T he CGT has consistently re
pulsed governm ental dem ands for
a social truce an d openly sought to
rally support for an alternative pol
icy to reactivate the economy.
Moves toward revitalization within
Peronist labor could spell serious
trouble for M enem ’s project.
N ot surprisingly, the strongest
supporters o f M enem ’s policies are
to be found in an em erging centerright alliance between ardently
menemista sectors o f Peronism and
the conservative Union del Centro
Democratico. Peronism ’s “historic
identity” an d its com m itm ent to so
cial justice will be sorely tested at
the level o f rank-and-file loyalty. It
may also have to cope with possible
electoral an d parliam entary realign
m ents in future congressional and
gubernatorial elections.

U nderlying these political and
econom ic transform ations stands a
striking contradiction. O n the one
hand, neoclassical prescriptions
call for rolling backing the state’s
role in the econom y and society;
on the o th er hand, the state bu
reaucracy m ust assume additional
roles an d responsibilities (for
which there is little social legitim a
tion) in support o f a marketdriven economy. In fact, greater
econom ic orthodoxy may well re
quire n o t less b u t m ore state inter
vention— albeit with different
objectives an d different benefici
aries—as well as m ore power con
centrated in the hands o f the
state’s bureaucratic elite.
This smaller b u t m ore agile
(and in some respects m ore power
ful) state has quite naturally been
welcomed by the dom in an t players
in the local and transnational busi
ness com m unities. T he agro-export
interests and industrial capitalists
capable o f exporting successfully to
world markets, however, have been
extrem ely reluctant to assume their
role as investors—a req u irem en t of
M enem ’s plans for industrial recon
version and greater international
competitiveness.
Moreover, the grupos economicos
(such as Perez C om panc and
Bunge & Born) and business’s dom
in an t industrial, financial, an d agro
export sectors have consistently
used their enhanced leverage to
m ake several dem ands: the elim ina
tion o f the fiscal deficit, the en d o f
price controls, the introduction o f
a favorable exchange-rate regim e,
and a heavier h an d with organized
labor. Some o f the m ore conserva
tive business sectors— im patient
with the cum bersom e procedures
o f dem ocratic politics—have even
urged M enem to steam roll the con
gress and to im plem ent marketoriented reform s thro u g h the
executive’s decree powers. Evi
dently at least some en trep ren eu rs
h arb o r a nostalgic longing for the
“efficiency” o f policymaking by
authoritarian edict.
Tragically, given an econom y
seriously weakened by decades o f

m ism anagem ent, this aggressive
neoliberalism probably will n o t en
g en d er vigorous growth and devel
opm ent. In view o f A rgentina’s
cu rren t political and econom ic con
ditions, free-m arket policies may
m ilitate in favor o f a perverse out
com e— the institutionalization of
speculative habits by business,
labor, an d consum ers. An economy
based on the logic o f p lu n d er and
get-rich-quick speculation is hardly
conducive to the “creative destruc
tio n ” so adm ired by advocates of
u n fettered m arket economies.
Despite the reform ing zeal o f the
M enem team and its 1991 success
in slashing inflation, A rgentina’s
long-term scenario may be one o f
high inflation, low investm ent
rates, and m ediocre m acroeco
nom ic perform ance.
T he long-term im plications of
M enem ’s neoliberalism for dem o
cratic politics are troubling as well.
To be sure, the specter o f authori
tarianism has certainly receded
and the prospects for consolidation
o f the electoral an d representa
tional aspects o f dem ocracy have
im proved considerably. Neverthe
less, the econom y’s decline is
deeply at odds with the forging o f a
stable dem ocratic class com pro
mise encom passing the congress
and the m ajor political parties, as
well as capital, labor, and the m id
dle class.
A rgentina’s politics are im
m ersed in a sea o f em bittered and
fractious interests, whose horizon
o f hopes and expectations often
fails to surface above the im pera
tive o f im m ediate needs. As was
true o f earlier resistance to authori
tarianism, contem porary struggles
for dem ocracy will be inextricably
linked to A rgentina’s Sisyphean
search for social justice an d a via
ble m odel o f econom ic growth. ■

Editor’s Note: Revised version of the
postscript to the paperback edition of
A uthoritarianism and the Crisis o f
the A rgentine Political Economy
(1991).
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Abandoning the “Third Position”
by Aldo C. Vacs

access to foreign m arkets for Argen
m ong the surprising
tine goods while opening Argen
policy turns taken by
tina’s m arket to foreign capital and
A rgentine president
goods. Cavallo’s replacem ent as
Carlos M enem was his
m inister o f foreign relations, for
decision to abandon
m er am bassador to the US Guido
the nationalist, nonDi Telia, has d eepened the na
aligned path o f Peronism ’s “T hird
tio n ’s com m itm ent to this dom es
Position.” U pon entering the presi
tic and international approach.
dency in 1989, M enem declared a
new, pragm atic approach to for
eign policy. Domestically the ad
m inistration adopted a neoliberal
econom ic strategy designed to re
Menem declared a
duce the external d ebt and attract
new, pragmatic
investm ent capital. Along the same
lines, the adm inistration initiated a
approach toforeign
foreign policy geared to im proving
relations with the US and the Euro
policy, geared to
pean Com m unity (EC), reestab
lishing relations with G reat Britain,
improving relations
and continuing the process o f eco
with the US and the
nom ic integration with the coun
tries o f the Southern Cone.
EC, reestablishing
M enem em barked upon this
new path o f dom estic and foreign
relations with
policy by appointing Dom ingo
Cavallo—a H arvard-trained econ
Great Britain, and
omist and form er president o f
continuing the
A rgentina’s Banco Central—as m in
ister o f foreign relations in July
process of economic
1989 and th en as m inister o f econ
omy in January 1991. Cavallo
integration with the
viewed A rgentina’s econom ic prob
rest of the Southern
lems as resulting from the n atio n ’s
conjuncture o f “socialism w ithout a
Cone.
plan and capitalism w ithout a m ar
ket.” His response fits squarely on
the m arket side, seeking to gain
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An initial obstacle to this ap
proach was US distrust, which was
rooted in the tradition o f Peronist
populism and nationalism , as well
as M enem ’s contradictory cam
paign statem ents. In response, the
M enem adm inistration reduced
A rgentina’s profile in the support
g roup for C entral A m erica’s Contadora peace process an d refused

to criticize the role o f the US in
C entral Am erican conflicts. M ore
over the adm inistration shelved the
idea o f prom oting a bloc o f ThirdW orld debtors, aligning instead
with the US position in favor of
individual-country negotiations
with international creditors.
In his first m eeting with Presi
d e n t George Bush, M enem
pledged his support for the war
against drugs, prom ised to h o n o r
A rgentina’s d ebt obligations, and
agreed that dem ocracy should be
restored in Panam a. T he M enem
governm ent mildly criticized th e in
vasion o f Panam a as a violation o f
the principle o f nonintervention.
N onetheless, the governm ent care
fully refrained from condem ning
the invasion, declaring th at the US
action would n o t im pair ArgentineUS relations. Likewise, to gain
favor with the US, M enem decided
to ignore strong opposition at
hom e an d to stand alone am ong
Latin Am erican countries by partici
pating in the anti-Iraq m obilization
orchestrated by the UN.
D uring B ush’s D ecem ber 1990
visit to Buenos Aires, he congratu
lated M enem for having quelled a
military rebellion, praising Ar
gentina’s president as a “world
leader in the field o f privatization”
an d stating th at US-Argentine rela
tions “are now excellent an d will
continue to im prove.” Bush prom 
ised to support A rgentina in its
debt negotiations with in terna
tional banks, b u t m ade it clear that
the country should n o t expect im
p o rtan t concessions.
T he developm ent o f cordial rela
tions, however, did n o t elim inate
bilateral problem s. In D ecem ber
1990 US am bassador T errence
T odm an set a letter to m inister of
foreign relations Cavallo an d m in

ister o f econom y Erm an Gonzalez,
d enouncing the alleged attem pt by
several u n n am ed high A rgentine of
ficials to obtain bribes from US
com panies before authorizing busi
ness transactions. T hough the
M enem adm inistration rejected
the accusations, the controversy
reduced the prospects for new US
investm ent an d credit. In mid-1991
an o th er problem arose w hen a US
congressional investigation indi
cated that several m em bers o f
M enem ’s in n er circle, such as the
presid en t’s sister-in-law an d audi
ences secretary, Am ira Yoma, and
h e r form er husband and chief o f
customs at A rgentina’s m ain in
ternational airport, Ibrahim al
Ibrahim , appeared to be involved
in m oney-laundering transactions
with d ru g traffickers and the Bank
o f C redit an d C om m erce Inter
national.
As for W estern Europe, M enem
and Cavallo an n o u n ced their inter
est in ending A rgentina’s feud with
G reat Britain over the MalvinasFalklands, which led to the Febru
ary 1990 reestablishm ent o f
Argentine-British diplom atic rela
tions as well as various trade and in
vestm ent agreem ents. Cavallo later
signed an accord with the presi
d e n t o f the Council o f Ministers
o f the EC to prom ote the develop
m en t o f A rgentina’s econom y and
social services an d to cooperate in
scientific-technological program s
and jo in t ventures. Reflecting the
renew ed interest o f European
investors was th e fact that consortia
o f Italian and Spanish com panies
purchased two m ajor A rgentine
state companies: ENTEL, the state
p h o n e an d telecom m unications en 
terprise, and Aerolmeas Argentinas,
the national airline.
M enem ’s Latin A m erican for
eign policy has focused on strength
ening trade relations and creating
jo in t enterprises with Brazil as well
as fostering econom ic integration
with Brazil and o th er neighboring
countries. Argentine-Brazilian
trade has been on the upswing,
based on A rgentina’s increased ex
ports o f food products and im ports

o f Brazilian m anufactured prod
ucts. Most im portant, on M arch 26,
1991, A rgentina, Brazil, Paraguay,
and Uruguay signed an agreem ent
creating MERCOSUR (Mercado
Comun del Cono Sur). They are
currently negotiating the in
corporation o f Chile and o th er
South Am erican countries, such
as Bolivia and Peru, into the com 
m on market.
It is likely th at A rgentina’s
foreign-policy tilt toward the US
an d W estern E urope will continue,
as the M enem adm inistration seeks
diplom atic support for its debt
negotiations with m ultilateral insti
tutions as well as foreign aid and
investm ent for its structural adjust
m ent program s. W hat is less clear

is how successful this approach will
be. So far, the benefits to A rgen
tina have been m eager: a n um ber
o f symbolic diplom atic rewards,
b u t no econom ic rewards o f the
m agnitude necessary to arrest the
national econom y’s long-term struc
tural decline. Indeed, US an d West
ern E uropean agricultural and
trade policies have w orsened Ar
gen tin a’s plight by m aintaining
export subsidies an d denying
A rgentine exports access to the
leading foreign markets. In sum,
while M enem ’s foreign policy has
reduced the chances o f confronta
tion with the US an d W estern Eu
rope, it has yet to be translated into
the econom ic concessions antici
pated by the policy’s architects. ■
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Lessons from Caribbean Elections
by Robert A. Pastor

A free andfair election is but one stride toward democracy. Given their
deep-rooted economic crises and social conflicts, countries such as Suriname
and Guyana must clear additional high hurdles in their questfor democracy
and development

em ocracy is a process
u n d e r the rule o f law
whereby a people select
and replace their leaders
at regular intervals in an
atm osphere that perm its
choice. Democracy requires a free
election, b u t it is m ore than that.
T h at is why we talk o f m onitoring
an entire electoral process, and not
ju st an election. For analytical and
policy purposes, it is useful to di
vide the dem ocratic process into
four stages: pre-election, election,
transition, and consolidation. Each
stage poses specific challenges that
m ust be surm ounted before the
country can successfully move on
to the next one, arriving ultimately
at a consolidated dem ocracy in
which civilian leaders have effective
authority over the military.
Democracy is no t a panacea for
social and econom ic problem s. In
deed, in the short term democracy
may seem poorly suited to solving a
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n atio n ’s econom ic crisis because so
lutions often require austerity and
sacrifices for long-term benefit.
This is why the transition from an
authoritarian governm ent to a con
solidated dem ocracy is often both
tenuous and dangerous.

One problem with
the democratic
transitions is that
the governmentsface
a double bind: they
need to broaden social
access to the political
process while also
slashing social
programs.

O ne problem with the dem o
cratic transitions in Latin America
and the C aribbean today is that the
new dem ocracies face a double
bind: they need to reduce the size
of their governm ents and elim inate
their fiscal and external deficits,

while sim ultaneously o p ening the
political process to groups th at are
often m aking desperate dem ands
for food, jobs, health, and educa
tion. A lthough the governm ents of
Latin A m erican countries seem al
most paralyzed by strikes, they have
been m ore courageous than Presi
d e n t G eorge Bush, who has been
unwilling to close th e US fiscal or
trade deficit as m uch as they have
been com pelled to do.
While the actors in each country
feel their particular difficulties are
special, there is an alm ost uncanny
pattern to the litany o f problem s
an d com plaints. In the experience
o f the Council o f Freely-Elected
H eads o f G overnm ent in m onitor
ing electoral processes and dem o
cratic transitions, the opposition in
every country was deeply suspicious
o f both the incum bent governm ent
and the electoral process. This dis
trust is born from a long an d tragic
history, and it is n o t w ithout contem poraryjustification. After every
adverse incident, opposition lead
ers extrapolate from the single in
stance th at a free election is n o t
possible, o r th at it is part o f a con
spiracy to rig the election. In m ost
cases there was a problem , b u t it
was n o t as large, om inous, o r wide
spread as the opposition thought.
M ore im portant, m ost o f these
problem s could be resolved.

T he Council o f Freely-Elected
H eads o f G overnm ent has m oni
tored electoral processes and dem o
cratic transitions in Nicaragua,
Panam a, the Dom inican Republic,
Guyana, Surinam e, and Haiti (the
dem ocratic transition o f the latter,
o f course, having suffered a tragic
setback with the military coup of
S eptem ber 1991). In the course of
its efforts the Council has learned a
great deal, som etimes by m aking
mistakes. W hat follows are six o f
the fundam ental lessons drawn
from its experience.
First, the Council o f FreelyElected H eads o f G overnm ent con
siders m onitoring the electoral
process or the dem ocratic transi
tion only if invited by all the key
parties— the governm ent, its oppo
sition, and the election officials.
This ensures th at the Council will
be viewed as fair and th at its recom 
m endations will be taken seriously.
Second, the Council tries to get
involved early in the electoral pro
cess. An election-m onitoring group
th at arrives a day or two before an
election can actually do a disservice
to democracy.
Third, the Council has learned
to listen closely to all charges o f
electoral irregularities, b u t n o t to
leap to any conclusions. Finding
the tru th in a polarized society
requires a great deal o f work;
solving a problem requires even
m ore.
Fourth, the Council tries to
work with all sides to identify the
priority problem s and seek their
resolution. T he fairness o f an elec
tion usually turns on the resolution
o f two to five crucial issues: the reg
istration process, the campaign,
the security o f candidates and
voters, access to the entire voting
process by opposition poll watchers
and international observers, and
the vote count. T he Council makes
clear to all parties th at its ability to
ju d g e a fair election depends on its
success in resolving these issues.
Fifth, the Council has learned
th at the best role observers can

Rene Ramos

What We’ve Learned

play is to try to encourage local par
ties to work o u t as many o f their
problem s am ong themselves as
possible. This is essential because
observers cannot resolve all the
problem s th at a culture o f distrust
evokes, and p art o f the dem ocratic
process requires th at all parties
com prom ise and work together.
In a consolidated dem ocracy
the opposition views the election
as fair. In transitional elections the
opposition does not have confi
dence in the governm ent o r the
process, and the governm ent re
jects the idea th at the opposition
should be able to veto the legiti
macy o f a free election. T he role o f
the observers is to m ediate the
problem s an d serve as a surrogate
for a fair process.
Sixth, the Council has learned
to stay away from an electoral pro
cess unless it can be certain that at
the en d it will be able to detect a
significant pattern o f fraud. Two of
its m ost im portant techniques are
the random selection o f sites to ob
serve the election an d a “parallel
co u n t” to prevent m anipulation o f
the count. If the Council detects

fraud, it first tries to correct it, and
if this effort fails, then the Council
denounces the fraud. Since all par
ties know this is what the Council
will do, this approach serves as a
ra th e r effective deterrent.

A Broader Caribbean Strategy
These lessons apply to the pre
election and election stages. T he
Council has also been working on
issues o f dem ocratic transition and
consolidation. W hat is n eed ed now
is a general US strategy to deal with
the newly em erging dem ocracies
in a b ro ad er C aribbean context.
First, the C aribbean needs to
break loose from its past d ep en d 
ence on foreign aid and to ad o p t a
new econom ic strategy based m ore
on self-reliance. US aid and fi
nance should com plem ent an d re
inforce, ra th e r than substitute for,
such a program . T he new eco
nom ic strategy for the C aribbean
should include trade liberalization
with an export-bias; fiscal self-reliance with an effective tax system;
econom ic policy favoring invest
m ent over consum ption; an d de-
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regulation and privatization. This
recipe for success is politically cost
ly, and th at is why it is difficult to
im plem ent, let alone sustain. After
the new policies are im plem ented,
th en the US should take a similarly
bold step to increase aid and m ar
ket access.
T he C aribbean C om m on Mar
ket (CARICOM) should accept the
D om inican Republic, Surinam e,
and—if the Aristide regim e regains
power— Haiti, b u t only after chang
ing CARICOM’s treaty to guaran
tee dem ocracy in its cu rren t and
new m em bers. T he region should
agree to the steps it would take as a
u n it if dem ocracy were threatened
in any country. At the G eneral As
sembly in Ju n e 1991, the Organiza
tion o f Am erican States (OAS)
walked up to this question for the
first tim e and proposed that the
OAS m eet within ten days o f a
coup in a m em ber country. This
is a small, b u t encouraging first
step, which was p u t into practice in
O ctober 1991 when the OAS de
n o u n ced the coup in Haiti and im
posed trade sanctions. Because o f
its long-standing dem ocratic tradi
tion, CARICOM should advance
this idea several steps by defining
the diplom atic, econom ic, and
military sanctions that the dem o
cratic com m unity o f CARICOM
would take to prevent military
coups o r to reverse them if they
occur.
T he US should reinforce these
C aribbean efforts with a parallel
strategy, taking a long view and
realizing th at a relatively small
investm ent can yield a bountiful
dividend in assuring a dem ocratic
and prosperous neighborhood.
T he US should offer the C aribbean
a place at the table o f the negotia
tions for a N orth A m erican freetrade agreem ent. T he Caribbean
should first elim inate tariffs within
CARICOM an d lower its com m on
external tariff. But one way to accel
erate th at process is to provide the
C aribbean with an incentive, and
n o th in g would be b etter than an
invitation to jo in a wider N orth
Am erican free-trade area. ■
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Suriname Tries Again
by Gary Brana-Shute

n Christmas Eve o f 1990,
liam ent, was p u t in place, headed
Deputy C om m ander
by the powerless and, some would
Iwan Graanoogst o f Suri
argue, senile septuagenarian Jo h an 
n am e’s national army
nes Kraag. T he vice president and
telephoned the presiden
prem ier was the am bitious, tough,
tial palace in Param aribo,
and sm art Jules W ijdenbosch o f the
w here a cocktail affair was u n d erN ational Democratic Party (NDP),
way, an d inform ed the m em bers of
who had headed an appointed gov
the civilian governm ent that they
ern m e n t in the mid-1980s and
were dismissed from their posts.
whose party m aintains close ties
President Ramsewak Shankar and
with Surinam e’s powerful military.
the cabinet dutifully obeyed the
An NDP cabinet including some
telephone coup, and Surinam e was
fairly com petent technocrats took
off on an o th er ro u n d o f post-coup
over the levers o f state, dom inated
election preparation. Practice
the mass m edia, an d began its own
makes perfect. Following the coup
state-sponsored election campaign.
in 1980, election preparation took
seven years; this time it would take
six m onths, with elections being
scheduled for May 25, 1991.
The power of the
T he Christmas Eve coup was
largely a result o f military com
military—including its
m an d er Desi B outerse’s fury at be
puppet insurgencies in
ing detained incom m unicado in
the N etherlands while there with
the interior regions
President Shankar in early Decem
b er 1990. Shankar did nothing to
neutralized the
assist Bouterse, Surinam e’s de facto
ruler. In a dam aging photo— m uch
civilian leadership.
like that o f a helm eted US presiden
tial candidate Michael Dukakis in a
tank—Shankar is shown forlornly
standing in the rain sans paraplu
Meanwhile the Front, a coalition
outside the D utch foreign minis
party o f Afro-Surinamers, East In
te r’s residence. Back in Param a
dians, and Javanese, was caught
ribo, Bouterse called Shankar a
dead in the water. It m obilized for
jo k er and, in a p u n on the presi
the prom ised elections merely by
d e n t’s first nam e, ridiculed him as
renam ing itself the New F ront and
“Ram the W eak.”
incorporating the small Surinam e
Following the coup, an interim
Labor Party into its fold.
governm ent, ap pointed by Bou
terse and approved by a rum p par-
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Politics in Disarray

Gary Brana-Shute, an anthropologist,
has written extensively on Suriname,
where he served as an election monitor
for the Organization o f American States
in 1991.

T he 1980s were a troubled decade
for Surinam e, the polyethnic for
m er colony o f the N etherlands.
The 1980 military coup overthrew
a fragile parliam entary dem ocracy
th at was based on consociational

agreem ents o f proportionality and
access to financial and political
resources by the m ajor ethnic
groups— the Afro-Surinamese, the
East Indians, and the Javanese—
each o f which was represen ted by
its own political party. T he military
and its civilian patrons ruled the
country until 1987, when elections
were finally held. T he three m ajor
ethnic groups confederated into
the F ront for Democracy and Devel
op m en t in o rd e r to contest the elec
tions and, in a public m andate for
civilian control o f the governm ent,
won 41 o f the 50 seats in the
national assembly.
Constitutionally the president
was chief o f state and com m ander
in chief, while a vice president
served as prem ier, a cabinet super
vised the running o f governm ent,
and a national assembly com prised
the legislature. Yet n o n e o f this cor
responded to reality. T hro u g h the
military police an d com m ando
units, the military indirectly ruled
the country. T he power o f the mili
tary—including several p u p p et
insurgencies in the interio r re
gions— neutralized the civilian lead
ership. T he F ront stum bled along
until the 1990 coup when, morally
and intellectually bankrupt, the co
alition m anaged but a whisper o f
protest.
Foreign observers and local
in d ep en d en t commissions pro
nounced the May 1991 elections to
be free, open, and fair. To a large
degree they were correct, at least
for the city and coastal countryside.
N onetheless, the expansive, junglecovered interior district o f Sipaliwini— hom e to several Am erican
Indian groups and to the sizeable
M aroon population—was generally
sealed off from the cam paigns of
the New F ront and the third partici
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pating party, Democratic Alterna
tive ’91 (DA ’91)—a collection o f
young dissidents who had aban
d o n ed the New Front. Sipaliwini
houses five o r six insurgent move
m ents, several o f which are m anipu
lated by the military and hence
support th e NDP. H ence, the NDP
enjoyed access to the area while
th e o th er parties (and the civilian
police force) did not.
T he biggest surprise o f the elec
tions was DA ’91. In a m asterpiece
o f organization, DA ’91 mobilized
in all ten districts o f Surinam e with
a scant six m onths o f preparation.
In w hat is usually the political kiss
o f death in Surinam e, the party
actually discussed concrete and
thorny issues and did n o t pass ou t
free food and drink. Young, pro
gressive, capitalist, and proN etherlands and pro-US, DA ’91
successfully u n ited the dissident fac
tions th at had abandoned the New
F ront while playing by the ethnic
rules o f the game. T he DA ’91
m em bership came from the three
traditional ethnic blocs within the
old F ront plus M aroons, who had
formerly been taken for granted by
the old F ro n t’s Afro-Surinamer
bloc.
In the m eantim e, the treasurycontrolling NDP concentrated on
grassroots organization in rural
villages and urb an ghettos. This
cam paign strategy was eerily rem i
niscent o f 1970s vintage Michael
Manley with an overlay o f Maurice
B ishop’s socialist populism. As the
military stayed scrupulously in the
background, technocrats tinkered
with th eir spreadsheets and party
hacks passed o u t favors, prom o
tions, an d prom ises to all who
listened. Many voters did listen,
especially the young ones who were
fed u p with the im potent old tim
ers o f the F ront and saw no future
for themselves in the middle-class
DA ’91. T he NDP prom oted itself
as ethnically faceless. To some ex
ten t this was true, though the party
is mainly identified with left-wing
Afro-Surinamers.
In contrast to the carnival
jum p-up atm osphere o f the 1987
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elections, the 1991 elections were
somber, a reflection o f the public’s
frustration with the F ro n t’s inabil
ity to carry o u t the massive m an
date o f its 1987 victory. T he
prom ised removal o f the constitu
tional clause perm itting military in
tervention rem ained on the books,
an d ironically the military had
grown in strength. In addition, be
neath the jovial, happy-go-lucky
Surinam e spirit was a layer o f para
noia, spawned by insurgencies in
the jungle interior and urban ter
rorism in the form o f unexplained
m urders an d drive-by shootings in
Paramaribo.

Beneath thejovial
Suriname spirit was
a layer ofparanoia,
spawned byjungle
insurgencies and
urban terrorism.

In the past Surinam e’s elections
were less about choice than they
were im m ense national rituals
whose outcom es were foregone
conclusions. N ot so now, as voters
could choose from three m ajor
parties with distinctive ideas about
how to ru n the country. Demo
graphic, intellectual, an d ideo
logical change had transform ed
Surinam e. T he country h ad be
com e younger an d m ore urbane,
with a new generation o f politi
cians schooled in E uropean and
T hird W orld ideologies. Suri
n am e’s returning em igres were
unwilling to tolerate the authori
tarian good ol’ boys.

Electoral Results
T he elections yielded few surprises.
O f the national assembly’s 51 seats,
the old-guard New F ront won 30
(down from 41 in 1987). T he well-

funded, well-oiled NDP secured sec
on d place with 12 seats (up from
three in 1987). DA ’91 landed nine
seats. Smaller parties secured a
sm attering o f votes, b u t n o t
enough to win seats.
Following the election the New
Front en tered into a tailspin, as its
unexpectedly poor perform ance
set off a ro u n d o f internal bicker
ing. Aggravating the party’s disar
ray was its fierce com petition over
the division o f m inisterial seats. In
this context the New F ront has
been determ ined to form a govern
m ent w ithout cross-aisle coopera
tion from either the NDP or DA
’91. T herein lies the hitch: in the
absence o f interparty cooperation,
a constitutional clause requires a
two-thirds majority in the national
assembly to elect a president and
may bring the political process to a
grinding halt, possibly clearing the
path once m ore for military inter
vention. Yet the constitution has a
loophole, which the New F ront was
b en t on exploiting despite its po
tential for triggering chaos.
A lthough Surinam e’s president
is elected by a two-thirds majority
o f the 51-m em ber national assem
bly, the New F ront’s total o f 34
seats falls short by four votes. T he
constitution specifies, however,
th at if after two rounds o f voting
within the national assembly no
presidential candidate receives a
two-thirds majority, the selection
process is thrown into semi-public
forum at the level o f local P eople’s
Councils. These require only a sim
ple majority to elect a president.
People’s Councils were inaugu
rated in the 1987 elections in an
attem pt to reform the colonial
political structure. T h ere are over
800 council seats, whose distribu
tion overwhelmingly favors Para
m aribo. In spite o f the New F ro n t’s
dam aging losses in the 1991 elec
tions, it m anaged to win m ore
than 600 o f the council seats. This
m eans th at while voters indicated
their displeasure with the oldguard leadership o f th e New Front,
they rem ained relatively com fort
able with the New F ront as a famil

iar political party. In any case the
New F ront won m uch m ore than
the majority o f local council seats
required to elect a president.
O n Septem ber 6, 1991, about
three m onths after the general elec
tions, the P eople’s Council elected
New F ront candidate Ronald Venetiaan as president o f Surinam e.
Venetiaan, a 55-year-old m athe
matics professor and m em ber of
the Afro-Surinamese faction o f the
New Front, received 645 votes
against 116 for his m ain rival, for
m er vice president Jules Wijdenbosch, and 56 for DA ’91’s Hans
Prade.
Does the election o f a civilian
president from the New F ront sig
nal the en d o f military dom inance?
Probably not. W hether o r no t the
NDP is a military handm aiden, the
party is on a roll and can anticipate
future success. After all, the New
F ront will inh erit an em pty trea
sury. And w eakened as it is, the
New F ront is unlikely to do little in
the way o f serious policymaking.
W hether the New F ront will hold
together o r disintegrate into antag
onistic ethnic blocs is anybody’s
guess.

transshipping operations. In any
event the military can cast itself as
protector o f the urban population
from the “jungle barbarians” (as
the insurgent groups are perceived
in P aram aribo), perhaps eventually
in the form o f negotiating a truce.
Internationally there is military
and nonm ilitary posturing, with
the US and Brazil doing the form er
an d the N etherlands the latter. US
rhetoric is relatively unim aginative,
centering on threats o f arm ed inter
vention to dispatch the Surinam e
military once and for all. In the
afterm ath o f US arm ed interven
tion in Panam a and Iraq, however,
this is an unlikely event. In con
trast, Brazil continues to support
Surinam e’s military with handsom e
weapons sales and training pro
grams, having caught W ashington
and the H ague by surprise with its
harsh critique o f a possible EuroSurinam e union as the reestablish
m ent o f a colonial em pire on New
W orld shores.
A lthough signals from the
H ague are m ixed, there is talk o f
reestablishing a com m onwealth

relationship with Surinam e. This
would involve m onetary union with
the powerful Dutch guilder; collab
oration in, o r m onitoring of, Suri
n am e’s foreign affairs; some sort of
judicial an d military coordination;
and—heavens to colonial Betsy—
open travel access to the N ether
lands. T he idea has been greeted
with anticolonial bom bast in some
circles and misty-eyed nostalgia for
the neocolonial days in others.
W hether it is serious o r no t re
mains to be seen.
With its econom y shot and its
politics in turm oil, Surinam e now
languishes. T he military has not
budged and its closest ally, the
NDP, has becom e stronger—
thanks to free elections. T he
country’s insurgencies and drug
trafficking continue, while nearly
10,000 M aroon refugees rem ain in
French Guiana, uncertain o f their
status and fearful to repatriate
until a relocation policy is defined
and their safety guaranteed. W hat
will happen next is unclear. T here
m ight ju st be m ore free and fair
elections around the corner. ■

Knowns and Unknowns
T here are several o th er ingredients
in this political witches’ brew. Do
mestically, th ree o f the insurgen
cies with military connections (i.e.
those o f the A m erican Indian
Tukuyana, the Angulla Maroons,
and the M andela M aroons) could
substantially increase the civilian
stress level, as the in terior o f Suri
nam e has becom e divided between
warlords and the military. Ronnie
Brunswijk and his Jungle Com
m ando, who have been fighting
the military off an d on since 1986,
are h u n k ered down in a wait-andsee posture and may even be collab
orating with their old enemy. T he
reason is Brunswijk’s goal o f becom 
ing warlord king o f East Surinam e.
This is only possible with the ap
proval and com pliance o f the mili
tary, which could use Brunswijk to
p rotect its narcotics processing and
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Vision for a Free Guyana
by CheddiJagan

his is a crucial time that
“tries m en ’s souls”—a
tim e o f trem endous
changes worldwide. We
in the P eople’s Progres
sive Party (PPP) have rec
ognized these changes in charting
a dynamic new course for the na
tional reconstruction o f o u r coun
try. Guyana needs sound econom ic
policies, involvem ent for o u r peo
ple, an d revival o f national confi
dence. We n eed accountable
governm ent with a m anagem ent
orientation free o f corruption and
with transparency in its financial
affairs.
These features were last seen
in th e PPP governm ent o f 1957 to
1964. T h at was the only period in
o u r country’s history with a clear
direction and sustained growth,
based on the encouragem ent o f pri
vate capital, a vibrant cooperative
sector, an d with a small, efficient
and profitable state sector.
Somewhere I heard the story of
a couple who wished to rejoin each
o th er on th eir life’s journey. U pon
inquiring how this could be done,
the wife was told: “Have faith in
your partner. Walk confidently
ahead and he will follow.” T he
wife again inquired: “But how do I
know he is really com ing with m e?”
Came the answer: “If you trust him,
you will recognize his footsteps.”
I
invite you to recognize our
footsteps. They have left indelible
prints in the annals o f o u r coun
try’s search for real developm ent

T

Editor’s Note: Edited excerpts o f an
address by CheddiJagan, general secre
tary of the People’s Progressive Party of
Guyana, to businessmen and profession
als, on June 8, 1991, in Georgetown,
Guyana.
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and prosperity. T he PPP has a
brilliant track record. We have dem 
onstrated o u r capacity to inspire
production and to invigorate eco
nom ic life. As governm ent in the
1957-64 period, the PPP showed, in
spite o f harassm ent, an average an
nual growth rate o f 7% in bauxite,
7% in sugar, 8% in m anufacturing,
and 10% in rice. And o u r vision

If the People’s
Progressive Party can
follow its footsteps of
1957-64, it will make
Guyana into the
breadbasket of the
Caribbean.

produced the Bank o f Guyana, the
Guyana School o f Agriculture, and
the University o f Guyana, which
some had deem ed ‘pagan’s N ight
School.” We solved problem s in
electricity, telecom m unications,
drainage an d irrigation, transport,
health, housing, education, an d so
on. T he people had ab u n d an t and
cheap food. If we can again follow
those footsteps, we will m ake Guy
ana into the breadbasket o r food
bowl o f the Caribbean!
Those footsteps have n o t only
led us to successes in business and
state m anagem ent. They were the
source o f national pride. Every one

o f o u r state enterprises was effi
ciently m anaged, providing need ed
services an d m aking profits— Guy
ana Airways C orporation, Guyana
Electricity C orporation, Guyana
Rice M arketing Board, Guyana
M arketing C orporation, Guyana
Rice D evelopm ent C orporation,
T ransport an d H arbours D epart
m ent, Guyana T elephone C orpo
ration, and Guyana Industrial
D evelopm ent C orporation. Ours
was a success story!
O u r prom otion o f industrializa
tion through Guyanese capital was
innovative an d im peccable. N eed I
rem ind you o f the establishm ent of
the Ruimveldt Industrial Estate,
the Industrial D evelopm ent C orpo
ration, and the massive agricultural
schemes—Black Bush Polder,
Tapakum a, etc.? N eed I rem ind
you o f o u r assistance, including
crop bonuses and subsidies to farm 
ers, and protection o f Guyanese
business such as C ontinental Agen
cies Paint Factory, Banks Brewery,
the C hipboard Factory, stone quar
ries, rice mills, sawmills, etc.?
T hat legacy, coupled in the
im m ediate postindependence pe
riod with a golden handshake, for
eign investm ent, an d overgenerous
US aid, had caused one com m enta
tor to observe that Guyana would
becom e a m odel for the T hird
World. T hat same com m entator re
cently wrote that Guyana was bleed
ing to death. Yet the architects of
o u r tragic bloodletting are today
pleading for an o th er “ch ance” and
“continuity”! W hat a shame!
But we m ust n o t forever merely
look b eh in d us with nostalgia.
Rather, we m ust walk boldly for
ward, in unity and in confidence.
We m ust feel fortified only by the
fact that we m ade strides before
and th at we can rep eat o u r per-

form ance. We m ust feel capable o f
making o u r beloved country ten
times m ore beautiful!
U nfortunately we are starting
from a position o f collapsing physi
cal and social infrastructure, rec
o rd low levels o f production in the
m ajor sectors o f the economy—
sugar, rice, and bauxite—and alien
ation o f o u r people, which have led
to mass m igration o f o u r youths
and o f o u r m ost productive people.
T he prospects for revival are daunt
ing and m onum ental and will re
quire the trust and support o f all if
we are to restore Guyana to its for
m er splendor. For us, econom ic reu iv c il m n c t h p K c is p H n n t w r » n i l l ^ r s 1

strate social responsibility. To para
phrase the words o f J o h n F. Ken
nedy, the private sector m ust ask
no t what the country can do
for it, b u t what it can do for the
country. As I said at the PPP Port
M ouran rally: “Now is the time
when we m ust all give a little m ore
for o u r freedom ; we m ust care a lit
tle m ore for our people; we m ust
sacrifice a little m ore for the great
er good o f o u r nation and h er
future.”

Since the root-cause
of the crisis is low
production, the PPP
urill go all out to
reactivate the
economy. The party
expects the private
sector to play a pivotal
role.

T he state sector has taken a lick
ing, prim arily because o f political
interference, leading to m isman
agem ent. T he present rulers have
helplessly resorted to divestm ent
from a position o f weakness and in
a m ann er shrouded in secrecy. The
PPP holds no dogm atic position on
divestment. While we see no future
nationalization, o u r governm ent
will critically exam ine every en ter
prise in the public sector, an d in
consultation with the business com
m unity and the labor m ovem ent
we will seek ou t ways to ensure
their viability.
We will ensure a conductive
business environm ent. In this re
gard a dem ocratically elected gov
ern m en t will count on the goodwill
o f overseas Guyanese, friendly gov
ernm ents, an d m ultilateral lending
agencies to provide the foreign in
flows to refurbish o u r infrastruc

ture and p u t back on line o u r idle
productive capacity, which will
im pact directly on o u r n atio n ’s
ability to produce and export. In
o ther words, we envisage support
for a mini-Marshall Plan as pro
posed by the C aribbean Council of
C hurches’ Mission to Guyana. Guy
ana m ust m aintain its credit worth
iness, which o u r rules wantonly
surrendered for many years. A new
governm ent will no t break with the
International M onetary Fund, b u t
will negotiate m odified term s and
conditions that will not penalize
o u r people and affect the ability to
increase o u tp u t in the productive
sector. Experience is showing that
devaluation, high interest ra te /
credit squeeze, and wage freeze/
wage restraint policies are n o t only
contradictory, b u t are the very op
posite to the intended stabilization
an d recovery.
We believe, as the form er Bar
badian central bank governor,
Dr. C ourtney Blackman, repeatedly
stated, th at devaluation as an instru
m ent o f econom ic policy has palpa
bly failed in Guyana. T he UN 1989
world econom ic survey also n o ted
that Bolivia, Ghana, Jam aica, Mex
ico, and the Philippines, which
have undergone W orld Bank aus
terity measures, have n o t funda
mentally altered their econom ic
structure.
Countries like Guyana n eed re
flation, no t deflation, o f the econ
omy. Businessmen want stability in
currency and interest rates and a
strong and in d ep en d en t central
bank, like the US Federal Reserve
System. In the m arket economy,
the way to reflation is a low interest
rate and the way to attract invest
m ent capital is a stable currency
rate.
In Guyana n o t a low b u t a high
interest-rate policy was adopted by
the rulers. While this was deem ed
necessary to curb inflation and the
parallel m arket in currency trad
ing, at the same tim e it squeezed
the local businessm en, thus defeat
ing one o f the m ajor “recovery ob
jectives”— increased production for
export an d foreign earnings.
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his is a crucial time that
“tries m e n ’s souls”—a
tim e o f trem endous
changes worldwide. We
in the P eople’s Progres
sive Party (PPP) have rec
ognized these changes in charting
a dynamic new course for the na
tional reconstruction o f o u r coun
try. Guyana needs sound econom ic
policies, involvem ent for o u r peo
ple, and revival o f national confi
dence. We n eed accountable
governm ent with a m anagem ent
orientation free o f corruption and
with transparency in its financial
affairs.
These features were last seen
in the PPP governm ent o f 1957 to
1964. T h at was the only period in
o u r country’s history with a clear
direction and sustained growth,
based on th e encouragem ent o f pri
vate capital, a vibrant cooperative
sector, and with a small, efficient
and profitable state sector.
Somewhere I heard the story of
a couple who wished to rejoin each
o th er on th eir life’s journey. U pon
inquiring how this could be done,
the wife was told: “Have faith in
your partner. Walk confidently
ahead and he will follow.” T he
wife again inquired: “But how do I
know he is really com ing with m e?”
Cam e the answer: “If you trust him,
you will recognize his footsteps.”
I
invite you to recognize our
footsteps. They have left indelible
prints in the annals o f our coun
try’s search for real developm ent

T

Editor’s Note: Edited excerpts o f an
address by CheddiJagan, general secre
tary o f the People’s Progressive Party of
Guyana, to businessmen and profession
als, on June 8, 1991, in Georgetown,
Guyana.
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an d prosperity. T he PPP has a
brilliant track record. We have dem 
onstrated o u r capacity to inspire
production an d to invigorate eco
nom ic life. As governm ent in the
1957-64 period, the PPP showed, in
spite o f harassm ent, an average an
nual growth rate o f 7% in bauxite,
7% in sugar, 8% in m anufacturing,
and 10% in rice. And o u r vision

If the People’s
Progressive Party can
follow its footsteps of
1957-64, it will make
Guyana into the
breadbasket of the
Caribbean.

produced the Bank o f Guyana, the
Guyana School o f Agriculture, and
the University o f Guyana, which
some h ad deem ed ‘Jag a n ’s N ight
School.” We solved problem s in
electricity, telecom m unications,
drainage an d irrigation, transport,
health, housing, education, an d so
on. T he people had ab u ndant and
cheap food. If we can again follow
those footsteps, we will m ake Guy
ana into the breadbasket o r food
bowl o f the Caribbean!
Those footsteps have n o t only
led us to successes in business and
state m anagem ent. They were the
source o f national pride. Every one

o f o u r state enterprises was effi
ciently m anaged, providing need ed
services and m aking profits— Guy
ana Airways C orporation, Guyana
Electricity C orporation, Guyana
Rice M arketing Board, Guyana
M arketing C orporation, Guyana
Rice D evelopm ent C orporation,

form ance. We m ust feel capable of
making o u r beloved country ten
times m ore beautiful!
U nfortunately we are starting
from a position o f collapsing physi
cal and social infrastructure, rec
ord low levels o f production in the
m ajor sectors o f the econom y—
sugar, rice, and bauxite—and alien
ation o f o u r people, which have led
to mass m igration o f our youths
and o f o u r m ost productive people.
T he prospects for revival are daunt
ing and m onum ental and will re
quire the trust and support o f all if
we are to restore Guyana to its for
m er splendor. For us, econom ic re
vival m ust be based on two pillars:
dem ocracy an d people. This is the
h eart and soul o f o ur liberal and
hum ane socialist belief!
It is o u r cherished belief that
the hum an factor for mobilization
and developm ent can thrive only
in a clim ate o f freedom and in an
environm ent o f participatory de
mocracy. This we can achieve
u n d er o u r proposed ethnic-balanced and class-balanced broadbased governm ent—a governm ent
that m ust be a partnership between
labor and capital; a partnership be
tween local and foreign enterprise;
a partnership o f the whole people
for the com m on good o f Guyana.
T he concepts o f “enem ies o f the
state” and “mafias” m ust have no
place in a free Guyana!
Since the root-cause o f the
present crisis is low production
and p o o r productivity, the PPP in
governm ent will go all ou t to reacti
vate the econom y and breathe new
life into every sector. In this task we
expect the private sector to play a
pivotal role. As such, governm ent
will act as a catalyst to facilitate
growth by rem oving red tape and
allocating resources to stimulate
productive endeavors. I share the
view o f [Jamaica’s] Prim e M inister
M ichael Manley th at the state m ust
em power the e n tre p ren e u r and
em pow er the people for devel
opm ent.
T he private sector m ust not,
however, expect to be spoonfed.
It m ust show initiative and dem on

strate social responsibility. To para
phrase the words o f Jo h n F. Ken
nedy, the private sector m ust ask
n o t what the country can do
for it, bu t what it can do for the
country. As I said at the PPP Port
M ouran rally: “Now is the time
when we m ust all give a little m ore
for o u r freedom ; we m ust care a lit
tle m ore for o u r people; we m ust
sacrifice a little m ore for the great
er good o f o u r nation an d h er
future.”

Since the root-cause
of the crisis is low
production, the PPP
udll go all out to
reactivate the
economy. The party
expects the private
sector to play a pivotal
role.

T he state sector has taken a lick
ing, prim arily because o f political
interference, leading to m ism an
agem ent. T he present rulers have
helplessly resorted to divestm ent
from a position o f weakness an d in
a m an n er shrouded in secrecy. The
PPP holds no dogm atic position on
divestment. While we see no future
nationalization, o u r governm ent
will critically exam ine every enter
prise in the public sector, and in
consultation with the business com 
m unity and the labor m ovem ent
we will seek ou t ways to ensure
their viability.
We will ensure a conductive
business environm ent. In this re
gard a dem ocratically elected gov
ern m en t will count on the goodwill
o f overseas Guyanese, friendly gov
ernm ents, and m ultilateral lending
agencies to provide the foreign in
flows to refurbish o u r infrastruc

ture and p u t back on line o u r idle
productive capacity, which will
im pact directly on o u r n atio n ’s
ability to produce and export. In
o th er words, we envisage support
for a mini-Marshall Plan as p ro 
posed by the C aribbean Council o f
C hurches’ Mission to Guyana. Guy
ana m ust m aintain its credit worth
iness, which o u r rules wantonly
su rrendered for many years. A new
governm ent will n o t break with the
International M onetary Fund, but
will negotiate m odified term s and
conditions th at will n o t penalize
o u r people an d affect the ability to
increase o u tp u t in the productive
sector. Experience is showing that
devaluation, high interest ra te /
credit squeeze, an d wage freeze/
wage restraint policies are n o t only
contradictory, bu t are the very op
posite to the in tended stabilization
and recovery.
We believe, as the form er Bar
badian central bank governor,
Dr. C ourtney Blackman, repeatedly
stated, that devaluation as an instru
m ent o f econom ic policy has palpa
bly failed in Guyana. T he UN 1989
world econom ic survey also n o ted
that Bolivia, Ghana, Jam aica, Mex
ico, and the Philippines, which
have undergone W orld Bank aus
terity measures, have n o t funda
mentally altered their econom ic
structure.
C ountries like Guyana n eed re
flation, no t deflation, o f the econ
omy. Businessmen want stability in
currency and interest rates and a
strong and in d ep en d en t central
bank, like the US Federal Reserve
System. In the m arket economy,
the way to reflation is a low interest
rate and the way to attract invest
m ent capital is a stable currency
rate.
In Guyana n o t a low b u t a high
interest-rate policy was adopted by
the rulers. While this was deem ed
necessary to curb inflation an d the
parallel m arket in currency trad
ing, at the same time it squeezed
the local businessm en, thus defeat
ing o ne o f the m ajor “recovery ob
jectives”—increased production for
export and foreign earnings.

Hemisphere • Fall 1991

Features: The Caribbean

T he key to a stable currency is
increased p roduction and produc
tivity. This can be achieved, consid
ering o u r potential natural and
o th er resources. W hat is needed is
to overcom e “m an-m ade” problem s
and to attract o u r Guyanese m an
power h ere an d overseas. This
m eans deliberate policies aim ed at
reducing the cost o f living for the
working people through subsidies
o f basic com m odities, price con
trols on selected items, and an
ab u n d an t and cheap supply of
food. We did this before and we
can do it again!
It also m eans real incentives
for investm ent. A new governm ent
will review taxation rates at the
personal an d especially at the cor
porate levels, including the con
troversial consum ption tax. We
recognize that high taxation can be
counterproductive, reducing the
ability to mobilize capital to fi
nance investm ents for econom ic
growth. It also leads to tax evasion
an d capital flight. Additionally, ef
forts will be m ade to open up new
industrial estates, some o f which
will be linked to, and integrated
with, agribusiness.
E xport credit facility will be
established at interest rates that
p u t o u r exporters in a position to
rapidly increase exports. Red tape
th at adversely affects the efficient
processing o f applications for in
centives and h in d er production
and export will be removed.
Insofar as m ultinational corpo
rations are concerned, the PPP rec
ognizes they will bring with them
capital, technology, m anagem ent,
expertise, and m arkets needed in
o u r revival drive. In o rd er to attract
foreign investors into Guyana, we
will look at a num ber o f archaic
laws such as the “Capital Issues
C ontrol Act.”
In July 19901 told a group of
ab out a dozen American business
m en in W ashington at the office of
C aribbean and C entral Am erican
Action th at they would be wel
com ed, preferably in jo in t ven
tures, to play a partnership role in
o u r econom ic developm ent; fur

Hemisphere • Fall 1991

ther, that they would have, u n d e r a
changed governm ent, the advan
tage o f real political stability. I said
it m ust be clear that o u r econom ic,
social, and environm ental objec
tives m ust be fully recognized, and
that d ue regard be given for our
laws, independence, and sover
eignty.

Foreign investors will
be welcomed to play a
partnership role in
Guyana’s economic
development, as long
as they respect the
country’s economic,
social, and
environmental
objectives.

In D ecem ber 1990, in New York
City, I told the Leucadia Com pany
officials th at we w anted foreign par
ticipation, b u t n o t as in the days
when I grew up on a sugar estate,
and British G uiana was called
“Bookers’ G uiana.” We want for
eign capitalized econom ic growth
to be in consonance with o u r na
tional goals and tem pered with
social justice.
Let me say a word o r two about
what is described as the “inform al
econom y” an d as “illegal traders.”
We adm ire their enterprise and
drive. We recognize their activities
grew o u t o f distortions in the do
mestic economy. We will do every
thing possible to assist them and to
bring them within the overall for
mal economy. In this regard we will
consider the reduction o f custom
duties, especially on foodstuff and
o th er consum er items to help
bring their activities on line.

Your new governm ent will
strengthen the system o f industrial
relations. T he absence o f industrial
strife and trust and confidence be
tween workers an d m anagem ent
are im portant in o u r overall strat
egy o f partnership between labor
and capital and will lead to growth
and expansion o f o u r economy. In
this regard we will insist on scrupu
lous observance o f collective bar
gaining rights, fair em ploym ent
practices, safe working environ
m ent, and protection for women
workers. In o u r national dem o
cratic state, adequate wages and
good working conditions are n o t
gifts, b u t sound investments.
We believe o u r party’s dream
for Guyana is the same dream of
the businessm en, the professionals
as well as the w orking people. T he
dream o f partnership is vital for
confidence-building: the confi
dence o f the people in the future
o f o u r country, in the currency o f
o u r country, in the governm ent o f
o u r country.
It is because o f this com m on
dream and destiny, o f this vision of
what is good for Guyana, th at the
PPP has decided to involve rep re
sentatives o f various socioeconom ic
organizations such as the C ham ber
o f Com m erce, the Guyana M anu
facturers’ Association, CAGI, the
Labour Movement, etc., in the
planning and execution o f the
program s for reconstruction, eco
nom ic growth, and hum an develop
m ent. It is also for this reason th at
my party rejects “winner-takes-all”
politics and is including a civic com
p o n e n t on its electoral slate.
Given your support and m an
date, my party intends to form a
plural dem ocratic governm ent to
tackle the tasks o f reconstruction
ahead an d to lay the viable founda
tions for Guyana to en ter the 21st
century with h o n o r an d in prosper
ity. Let us collectively achieve the
dream s that all o f us so fervently
share. Let us aim at retu rn in g o ur
nation to the pedestal it once oc
cupied in the region. I invite you
all to jo in us in this noble en 
deavor. ■

Ne<w from University Presses of Florida
Cuba in the 1850s
Through the Lens of
Charles DeForest Fredricks
Robert M. Levine
„

Fuente de la India, Havana.

Jamaican Sayings

“Previously unpublished, these
photographs document a
turning point in Cuban life,
as the island was on the
verge of social, economic,
and technological moder
nity. .. .This intriguing
little album will delight
both students of Latin
American history and pho
tography buffs.”— Booklist
University of South Florida Press
Cloth $22.95

W ith Notes on Folklore,
Aesthetics, & Social Control
G. Llewellyn Watson
“A rich and compelling collection that will make a signif
icant contribution to the study of Jamaican/West Indian/
black folklore and culture.”— Daryl Cumber Dance,
Virginia Commonwealth University
Florida A & M University Press
January 272 pp. 6 X 9 Cloth $29.95

Conchtown USA
Bahamian Fisherfolk in Riviera Beach, Florida
Photographs and Text by Charles C. Foster
Folk Songs and Tales collected by Veronica Huss
“The combination of folklore, oral history, and photo
graphs makes this a work of interest to general readers and
scholars alike.”— Stetson Kennedy
Florida Atlantic University Press
April 160 pp. 8 1/2X11 Paper $24.95

Amphibians and Reptiles
of the West Indies
Descriptions, Distributions, & Natural History
Albert Schwartz and Robert W. Henderson
“A definitive synopsis of West Indian herpetofauna. ”
—George R. Zug, National Museum of Natural History,
Smithsonian Institution
University of Florida Press
May 740 pp. 7 X 10 Cloth $75.00

U.S. Policy in Central America
The Endless Debate
Dario Moreno
“A n excellent analysis of the evolution of U.S. Central
American policies under the Carter and Reagan admin
istrations that exposes the roles played by competing
strategic visions and bureaucratic interest groups in shap
ing two of the most dramatic failures in recent U.S. for
eign policy.”—Andrew A. Reding, World Policy Institute
Florida International University Press
Cloth $26.95 Paper $14.95

Central America and the Middle East
The Internationalization of the Crises
Edited by DamidnJ. Fernandez
“This valuable contribution addresses a neglected dimen
sion of the current crisis and goes far to explain why
Central American conflict has been so hard to resolve.”
—G. Pope Atkins, U.S. Naval Academy
Florida International University Press
Cloth $26.95 Paper $15.95

The Libro de las profecias
of Christopher Columbus
An en face editon
Translation and commentary by
Delno C. West and August Kling
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“Perhaps the most important
single volume on Columbus ever
published in English.. . . The
authors’ classification of Columbus’s
piety as ‘evangelical’ will be contro
versial, but is exactly right. He was as
cosmopolitan in his piety as in his
cosmography.”—Leonard Sweet,
president, Union Theological Seminary
University of Florida Press
May 288 pp. 8 1/2x11 Cloth $49.95
Through your local full-service bookseller, or direct from:
University Presses of Florida, 15 N.W. 15th St., Gainesville,
Florida 32611. 904-392-1351. Include $3.00 (UPS) or $2.00
(bookpost) shipping for the first book, $.50 for each additional
book. Florida residents add 6% sales tax to book price.
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Castro’s Premature Biography
by Lisandro Perez

G u e rrilla P rin ce: T h e U n to ld
S to ry o f F id el C astro
by Georgie Anne Geyer. Little, Brown
and Company, 1991. 445 pp. $22.95.
omeday, som ebody is
going to write the defini
tive biography o f Fidel
Castro. N one o f the ones
pro d uced thus far, includ
ing Guerilla Prince: The
Untold Story o f Fidel Castro, can lay
claim to being that definitive work,
but, by and large, th at is n o t the
fault o f those who have w ritten
ab out the Cuban leader.
In the case o f Georgie Ann
Geyer, it is clear she has spent years
doing research, exam ining every
source, and interviewing anyone
who could even rem otely shed
light on the subject. And yet, it is
still lacking. T he m ain thing it
lacks is time. It is a prem ature
biography.
T he obvious way in which it is
prem ature is that, o f course, the
story is n o t over. T he final chap
ter—which may tu rn o u t to be the
m ost revealing an d dram atic of
all— cannot yet be written. But it
also lacks the research possibilities,
distance, an d perspective that only
tim e can give to any biography,
and especially the biography o f
som eone who has been both
praised and dam ned, loved by
some and h ated by others. T he de
finitive biography o f Huey Long,

S

Lisandro Perez is associate professor of
sociology and director of the Cuban Re
search Institute at Florida International
University. His publications include
“The 1990s: Cuban Miami at the Cross
roads, ’’Cuban Studies/Estudios
C ubanos (1991).
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for example, appeared 34 years
after his death. Tim e had to elapse
before some o f the m ost im portant
inform ants would speak openly, be
fore the subject would cease to be
hopelessly m ired in acrimony, and
before the true im pact o f the per
son could be judged. T he defini
tive biography o f Castro will n eed a

The obvious way in
which the biography is
premature is that the
story is not over. The
final chapter—which
may turn out to be the
most revealing and
dramatic of all—
cannot yet be written.

biographer as consum m ate and de
tached as Huey L ong’s. T. Harry
Williams was a seasoned Civil War
historian who tu rn ed his attention
to Long w ithout any previous re
search experience (or baggage) on
the m an o r his era. T he work won
the Pulitzer Prize and the National
Book Award.
We may n o t have to wait as
m uch as 34 years after C astro’s
death for his biography, b u t it is
clear from Geyer’s book that we

have some waiting to do. Along
with o th er previous biographers of
Castro, she is unable to m aintain
even a m inim al detachm ent from
h er subject. In h er case it is evident
she dislikes the C uban leader in
tensely. While h er negative per
spective may well be justified, it is
seldom kept in check. T he result is
a biography in which the biogra
p h er is at war with the subject,
stooping at times to innuendo,
gossip, and gross exaggeration, fre
quently in tones o f irony and ridi
cule. For exam ple, the ch apter on
C astro’s econom ic program s is en
titled ‘T h e Dictator o f the Cows”
and includes passages such as this
one: “. .. it was cows th at truly riv
eted him , cows that becam e the ful
crum o f his obsession to control
every living thing on his island, if
no t the world . . . he h ad created a
revolution against all odds . . . now
he would create new life beyond
o th er odds .. .” (p. 328).
Apparently in an attem pt to
elicit from the reader contem pt for
the subject, Geyer frequently goes
way beyond the data and sources
into flights o f im agination an d spec
ulation that significantly detract
from the work’s notable contribu
tions. Those lapses o f seriousness
are exem plified by the following
unfortunate passage, which should
have fallen to an ed ito r’s pencil.
It refers to Castro’s visit to the US
in April 1959: “Everywhere he
went, the Americans he feared and
hated lionized him. M en who wore
p ro p e r three-piece suits to the of
fice and dutifully shaved twice a
day now, in their fantasies, imag
ined themselves a Fidel Castro.
W om en with spindly-legged hus
bands who left their bungalows
every m orning for desk jo b s and re
tu rn ed tired and irritable at night,

for a m om ent h ad the daring to
see themselves in Fidel C astro’s
arm s” (pp. 230-31).
In d eed there is a certain ob
session in this work with Castro’s
p u rp o rted sensuality and with his
sexual life. Those are, o f course,
valid topics for any biographer.
N onetheless, perhaps because Cas
tro has been secretive about that as
pect o f his life, Geyer frequently
treats it with a tone akin to a tat
tling expose com plete with hearsay
and trivialities.
This biography suffers from an
o th er shortcom ing linked to its pre
maturity. As can be expected, the
bulk o f the large nu m ber o f inter
views she has p u t together refer
exclusively to C astro’s life p rio r to
the mid-1960s. O f the 26 chapters
in the book, only the last four deal
with Castro’s life since the 1960s.
T he reason is obvious: m ost of
Geyer’s inform ants, those who pro
vided the m aterial that gave the
early chapters th eir richness, are
living outside o f C uba an d had
p arted com pany with Castro by the
late 1960s. Those who have been
by his side since then are n o t (yet)
available to talk.
And so it is th at Geyer is able to
give us details from testimonies
ab out Castro’s actions and words
when he was in high school, at the
university, and in the Sierra. We
get vivid images o f the night before
the M oncada, o f the trips to the
US, an d even o f his activities d u r
ing the Bay o f Pigs and the Missile
Crisis. O n the o th er hand, there is
no th in g with such biographical
dep th on the decision to e n ter Af
rica, the Angola campaign, the cri
sis o f the Peruvian embassy, Mariel,
o r the invasion o f G renada. Those
events and periods are dealt with in
the style o f history o r journalism ,

b u t n o t biography. In fact, the last
four o r five chapters are little m ore
than an overview o f the m ajor
events in C uban history during the
1970s and 1980s. T here is almost
exclusive dependence on second
ary sources and there is little that is
new to anyone who has followed
C uban affairs.

Only the lastfew
chapters deal with
Castro’s life since the
1960s. The reason is
obvious: most of the
informants are living
outside of Cuba and
had parted company
with Castro by the late
1960s.

Despite all its shortcom ings, this
book is worth reading, if only for
the early chapters. This is especially
true for chapters four and five,
which focus on the years in the uni
versity and C astro’s initiation into
politics and violence as well as the
relation between the two. No o ther
biographer o f Castro does a better
jo b o f presenting a co h eren t pic
ture o f the political socialization
o f the m an. Geyer describes how

he learned the im portance o f o p er
ating outside established institu
tions, th at electoral processes
would get him nowhere, th at it
was im portant to recognize and
seize the precise political m om ent,
th at there should be little hesita
tion in the use o f violence, and
that preem ption and vengeance
were critical for survival. T he vola
tile political clim ate o f the Autentico
years ho n ed a m ind that, from
childhood, was exceptionally guile
ful. After reading those chapters,
and with the benefit o f hindsight,
one can only conclude th at the
chances were very rem ote th at this
m an, once in power, would have
agreed to establish a participatory
democracy.
Geyer is at h e r finest in those
early chapters. She largely sticks to
the testimonies she assembled,
places them in their p ro p er
context, an d arrives at plausible
analyses w ithout overreaching,
trivializing, o r engaging in flights
o f the im agination.
Despite, or perhaps because of,
h er dislike for Castro, Geyer insists
on presenting a picture o f the
C uban leader as a political super
m an, a m an with incredible m ental
resources for the task o f political
survival, for staying ahead and on
top, for successfully m aneuvering
and using people to his advantage.
This is a m an who anticipates a situ
ation and is m eticulous in his at
tem pts to control it.
If such a portrayal is accurate,
an d indeed there is little basis for
arguing against it, it has implica
tions for anticipating the eventual
en d o f C astro’s rule. After reading
this book, it is difficult to avoid the
conclusion th at C astro’s rule will
en d either on his deathbed o r with
an ignom inious whim per. ■
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Structural Adjustment Policies in Argentina
by Marian Goslinga

considerable am ount o f cu rren t literature on Latin Am erica focuses on program s o f econom ic stabilization
and structural adjustm ent, which are central to international political controversies over how to reactivate
Latin Am erican econom ies and prom ote their developm ent. In 1991 A rgentina’s structural adjustm ent
program u n d er President Carlos M enem has contributed to a dram atic fall in the country’s rate o f inflation
and the approval o f m ajor new foreign loans. But what are the long-term econom ic and social im plications
o f M enem ’s program ? T he literature listed below dates from 1989.

Ahorro, inversion y financiamiento
en Argentina y Filipinas: un analisis
comparado. Jose M aria Fanelli,
R oberto Frenkel, Guillerm o
Rozenwurcel. Integration Latinoamericana, v. 167 (May 1991), p. 6489. [Includes a com m entary by
Pablo Gerchunoff.]

Argentina: hacia una economia de
mercado. Fundacion de Investi
gations Economicas Latinoamericanas. Buenos Aires: M anantial,
1990. 174 p.

Algunas reflexiones y perspectivas
sobre el endeudamiento extem o
argentino. Carlos Melconian,
Rodolfo Santangelo. Monetaria,
v. 12 (January/M arch 1989), p. 2756. [Discusses foreign exchange
rates, interest rates, and foreign
d eb t conversion schemes.]

Argentina: Menem Ditches the
Dogma. Norman Peagam, Charles
Scott. L ondon: Eurom oney Publica
tions, 1990. 28 p. [1990 Sum m er
S upplem ent to the periodical
Euromoney.]

Argentina y Brasil: ajuste, crecimiento e integracion. Aldo Ferrer.
Comertio Exterior, v. 41, no. 2 (Febru
ary 1991), p. 135-44.

Argentina: Reforms for Price Stabil
ity and Growth. World Bank. Wash
ington, DC: T he Bank, 1990. 290 p.
[Discusses the recen t econom ic sta
bilization policies.]

Argentina, 1946-1983: The Eco
nomic Ministers Speak. Guido di
Telia, Carlos Rodriguez Braun. New
York: St. M artin’s Press, 1990. 219
p. $59.95. [Based, in part, on pa
pers presented at a symposium
h eld in Toledo, Spain, 1984. In
cludes the opinion o f each author
ity on the policy applied and the
restrictions faced.]

Marian Goslinga is the Latin Ameri
can and Caribbean librarian at Florida
International University.
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Argentina: The Farce Continues.
The Latin American Times, v. 10,
no. 5 (Novem ber 1990), p. 1-6.
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The Argentine Economy: Policy Re
form for Development. Eduardo R.
Conesa. Lanham : University Press
o f America, 1989. 124 p. $27.50.
[Published in cooperation with the
C enter for International Affairs,
Harvard University.]
Austerity and Regional Develop
ment Strategy in Argentina and
Latin America. A lejandro Rofman.
In Lost Promises: Debt, Austerity, and
Development in Latin America, edited
by William L. Canak. Boulder,
Colo.: Westview Press, 1989.
Banca central en America Latina:
selection de textos. Jesus Silva-

Herzog, Ramon Lecuona V., eds.
Mexico: C entro de Estudios Monetarios, 1990-91. 2vols. [About the
experiences o f the central banks in
handling the foreign d eb t problem
and financing econom ic develop
m ent.]
El Banco Mundial y el Plan Baker:
analisis del caso argentino. Alfredo
Garcia, SilviaJunco. Boletin Informativo Techint (January/February
1989), p. 33-61. [Includes general
background inform ation on the
loans received by A rgentina from
the W orld Bank an d the econom ic
policies adopted in accordance
with the loan agreem ents.]
Beharrungsinflation und
“heterodoxe” Stabilisierungspolitiek: Erfahrungen aus
Argentinien, Brasilien und Israel.
Friedrich L. Sell. Kredit und Kapital,
v. 23, H eft 1 (1990), p. 60-85. [Ex
am ines the causes and characteris
tics o f inertial inflation and the
reasons for the failure o f h etero 
dox stabilization program s in Is
rael, A rgentina, and Brazil in the
1980s. Summaries in English and
French.]
El Chaco: una economia “reajustada.” Andres Rabossi. Realidad
Economica, no. 6 (1990), p. 121-36.
[Assesses the econom ic situation in
the province o f Chaco; concludes
that regional developm ent policies
adopted since the 1970s have failed
to foster econom ic growth.]

El control de cambios en la Argen
tina: la liberation cambiaria y
crecimiento. Fundacion de Investigaciones Economicas Latinoamericanas. Buenos Aires: M anantial,
1989. 164 p.
Control de pretios e inflation: la
experiencia argentina reciente.
Fundacion de Investigaciones Eco
nomicas Latinoamericanas. Buenos
Aires: FIEL, 1990. 92 p. [Evaluation
o f anti-inflation measures, espe
cially price controls, adopted be
tween 1983 and 1989.]
The Crisis o f Argentine Capitalism.
Paul H. Lewis. C hapel Hill: Univer
sity o f N orth Carolina Press, 1990.
573 p. $49.95. [Focuses on the im
pact o f Peronism and the role of
pressure groups.]
A Delicate Balance: Confrontation
and Cooperation between Argen
tina and the United States in the
1980s. Aldo C. Vacs. Journal o f Interamerican Studies and World Affairs,
v. 31, no. 4 (W inter 1989), p. 23-59.
Democracy, Distributional Con
flicts and Macroeconomic Policy
making in Argentina, 1983-1989.
William C. Sm ith. Journal o f Interamerican Studies and World Affairs,
v. 32 (Sum m er 1990), p. 1-42.
[Traces the econom ic aspects of
the transition from military rule to
civilian governm ent.]
L’econom ie argentine a l’horizon.
Jorge Schvarzer. Notes et etudes
documentaires, no. 2 (1989), p. 97112.

Estado y grupos economicos, 19831989. Oscar Madoery. Buenos Aires:
C entro E ditor de Am erica Latina,

1990. 125 p. [Discusses A rgentine
econom ic policy measures.]
Exchange Liberalization and
Growth: Exchange Controls in Ar
gentina. Fundacion de Investigaciones
Economicas Latinoamericanas. Bue
nos Aires: FIEL, 1990. 45 p.
The Fall o f Labor’s Share in In
come and Consumption: A New
“Growth Model” for Argentina?
A driana Marshall. In Lost Promises:
Debt, Austerity, and Development in
Latin America, edited by William L.
Canak. Boulder, Colo.: Westview
Press, 1989.
Fijacion de precios en la industria
manufacturera bajo condiciones de
hiperinflacion: el caso argentino.
Ju an Pablo Villanueva, Ju an Carlos
Echeverry. Desarrollo Econdmico,
v. 31, no. 121 (April-June 1991),
p. 73-89. [Discusses the period
1982-89.]
El financiamiento extem o
argentino durante la decada de
1990: agenda y cursos de action.
Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones
Internationales. Buenos Aires:
Sudam ericana, 1989. 299 p. [Col
lection o f articles dealing with
m easures adopted to deal with the
A rgentine foreign d ebt problem ,
including a discussion o f foreign
investments.]
From Stabilization to Growth.
RudigerDombusch. W ashington,
DC: W orld Bank, 1990. 52 p. [Pre
p ared for the Second W orld Bank
C onference on D evelopm ent Eco
nomics, held in W ashington, DC,
April 26-27, 1990, this pap er as
sesses the prospects for the Latin
Am erican econom ies in the 1990s.]

El gasto publico en la Argentina,
1960-1988. Fundacion de Investi
gaciones Economicas Latinoameri
canas. Buenos Aires: FIEL, 1991.
Getting Tough, Argentina Tries to
End Subsidies to Industries that
Drain the Nation: Severe ForeignDebt Trouble Spurs Efforts to Re
form a Leaky System o f Taxes.
Peter Truell. The Wall StreetJournal
(May 31,1988), p. 211-12.
Historia de dos hiperinflaciones:
de Sourrouille a Erman Gonzalez.
Walter Graziano. Buenos Aires:
Fundacion Gabriel y Dario Ramos,
1990. 251 p.
IMF Conditionally: Coercion or
Compromises? Kendall W. Stiles.
World Development, v. 18 (July 1990),
p. 959-71. [Analyzes IMF decision
m aking on its term s o f intervention
and the extent the IMF staff re
sponds to various econom ic condi
tions in the borrowing nations.
Includes a case study o f Argentina.]
El impacto fiscal del pago de la
deuda externa: la experiencia ar
gentina, 1980-1986. M arta Bekerman. Desarrollo Econdmico, v. 29,
no. 116 (January-March 1990),
p. 529-51.
La inflation argentina contemporanea: consecuencia de las conditiones de acumulacion de
capital. R uben Leon Guillen.
Realidad Economica, nos. 1 /2
(1990), p. 198-213.
Inflation y estabilization en
America Latina: nuevos modelos
estructuralistas. Edward J. Amadeo,
et al.; Eduardo Lora, ed. Bogota,
Colombia: T ercer M undo, 1990.
[Includes a section on Argentina.]
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Publications Update

Inflation—Are We Next?: Hyperin
flation and Solutions in Argentina,
Brazil, and Israel. Pamela S. Falk, ed.
Boulder, Colo.: Lynne R ienner Pub
lishers, 1990. 166 p. $22.00.
Inflation in Argentina: Stop and Go
since the Austral Plan. Miguel A.
Kiguel. World Development, v. 19,
no. 8 (August 1991), p. 969-86.
La integration en la Cuenca del
Plata. Antonio Sanchez-Gijon.
Madrid: C ultura Hispanica, 1990.
278 p. [Appraisal o f econom ic co
operation am ong countries o f the
Rio de la Plata basin.]
Los limites de las politicas indus
tr ia ls en un periodo de reestructuracion regresiva: el caso de la
informatica en la Argentina. Daniel
Azpiazu, E duardo M. Basualdo,
H ugo NochtefF. Desarrollo Econd
mico, v. 30, no. 118 (July-September
1990), p. 151-72. [Discusses the ef
fects o f econom ic policy on the
electronics industry.]
Las logicas de la economia argen
tina: inflation y crecimiento.
Guillermo Vitelli. Buenos Aires:
Prendergast Editores, 1990. 446 p.
El “menu de opciones” y el programa de capitalization de la
deuda externa argentina. R oberto
Bouzas, Saul Keifman. Desarrollo
Economico, v. 29, no. 116 (JanuaryM arch 1990), p. 451-75.
Un m odelo sin retomo: dificultades y perspectivas de la econo
mia argentina. Jorge Schvarzer.
Buenos Aires: CISEA, 1990.
Negotiating Debt: The IMF Lend
ing Process. Kendall W. Stiles.
Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press,
1991. 211 p. [Cites the specific
experience o f A rgentina.]
Observaciones sobre los vinculos
existentes entre los subsidios y la
decadencia economica de la Ar
gentina. Julio J. Nogues. Desarrollo
Economico, v. 30, no. 117 (AprilJu n e 1990), p. 86-107. [Criticizes
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the governm ent’s recent econom ic
policies.]
Opening Late-Industrializing Econ
omies: Lessons from Argentina and
Australia. Gary W. Wynia. Policy Sci
ences (Am sterdam ), v. 23 (August
1990), p. 185-201. [Emphasizes
trade liberalization strategies in the
1970s.]
La politica economica de Menem:
del estado de bienester a la
reestructuration conservadora.
A rnaldo Bocco, Gaston Repetto.
Realidad Economica, no. 6 (1990),
p. 5-27. [Analyzes the econom ic
orientations o f President Carlos
M enem.]
Politica economica y deuda exter
na en America Latina. Jose Ramon
Garcia Menendez. Madrid: Instituto
de Estudios Politicos para America
Latina y Africa, 1989. 430 p.
[Examines the m onetarist policies
adopted in the 1970s and their role
in the foreign debt crisis o f the
1980s; emphasizes the countries o f
the Southern Cone.]
Politica industrial: lecciones de la
experiencia international. Ram on
O. Fradiani. Boletin Informativo
Techint (January/February 1990),
p. 35-61. [Presents options for
Argentina.]
Political Change and Public Enter
prise Performance: Argentina as a
Case Study. R obert E. Looney.
Rivista intemazionale di scienze
economiche e commerdali (M ilan),
v. 37 (January 1990), p. 77-91.
[Measures im pact o f regim e
change, 1961-81. Also examines
m acroeconom ic problem s, bureau
cratic authoritarianism , and na
tional stabilization.]
Politicas de estabilizacion e hiperinflacion en Argentina. Jose Maria
Fanelli, Roberto Frenkel. Buenos
Aires: C entro de Estudios de Es
tado y Sociedad, 1990. 232 p.
Por que cayo Alfonsin: el nuevo
terrorismo economico, los per-

sonajes, las conexiones, las claves
secretas. Luis Majul. Buenos Aires:
Editorial Sudam ericana, 1990.
292 p.
Programas de ajuste y estrategias
politicas: las experiencias recientes
de la Argentina y Bolivia. Vicente
Palerm o. Desarrollo Economico, v. 30,
no. 119 (O ctober-D ecem ber 1990),
p. 333-66. [This article was re
viewed by Adolfo C anitrot in De
sarrollo Econdmico, v. 31, no. 121
(April-June 1991), p. 125-33; the
au th o r (Palerm o) replied to this
com m entary in the same issue on
p. 134-39.]
The Progress o f Policy Reform in
Latin America. John Williamson.
W ashington, DC: Institute for Inter
national Economics, 1990. 88 p.
[Discusses the A rgentine case.]
Public Enterprise at the Cross
roads: Essays in Honour o f V. V.
Ramanadham./o/m Heath, ed. Lon
don: Routledge, 1990. 301 p. [Dis
cusses experiences and policy
options, including privatization,
with em phasis on developing coun
tries. Includes a case study o f Ar
gentina.]
Radicalismo y empresas publicas,
1983-1989. Aida Arango de Maglio.
Realidad Economica, no. 6 (1990),
p. 29-54. [Lists m easures adopted
towards public enterprises during
the Alfonsin adm inistration; some
em phasis on privatization policy.]
Reforma del Estado y transfor
mation national. Carlos Menem,
Roberto Dromi. Buenos Aires: Edito
rial Ciencias de la A dm inistration,
1990. 246 p.
Las relaciones de poder economico
en la Argentina actual: una aproximacion. Martin Asbomo. Buenos
Aires: CICSO, 1990. 115 p.
sQue hacer con el Estado?: privatizar para los m onopolios o democratizar la gestion economica.
Carlos Mendoza. Buenos Aires:
Ediciones Dialectica. 1990. 127 p.
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